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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF BROKER AND DEALER
DUTIES-SOME PROBLEMS IN ADJUDICATING THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECURITIES AND
COMMODITIES PROFESSIONALS
Gregory A. Hicks*
INTRODUCTION
There is considerable confusion over the expectations that investors may
have in their dealings with securities and commodities brokers and dealers.
A main source of that confusion is the uncertain significance of the fiduciary
label often attached to these market professionals, and an accompanying
uncertainty about the legal duties which the fiduciary label implies., Certain
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; J.D., 1978,
University of Texas; B.A., 1972, Yale University. The research and writing of this Article was
supported by a grant from the University of Washington Law School Foundation.
1. See, e.g., Romano v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 834 F.2d 523, 530
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2846 (1986); Leib v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Resistance to the fiduciary label has led some
courts to insist that the bare relationship between broker and customer or dealer and customer
is not fiduciary, and to require the existence of special circumstances before such a relation
will be found. See, e.g., Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 800 F.2d 177, 182 (7th Cir. 1986) (fiduciary relation arises where dealings between
customer and broker have caused customer to repose special trust or confidence); Caravan
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985)
(broker must control customer's account before fiduciary duty arises); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Boeck, 127 Wis. 2d 127, 131, 377 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1985) (nondis-
cretionary account does not give rise to fiduciary duty; court adopts very exacting standard for
finding a "special relationship" giving rise to extended duties). While these decisions seem
concerned with containment of the over-broad duties that might arise from application of the
fiduciary label, most courts have chosen to address the risks of application of the fiduciary
label by tailoring duties to the facts before them rather than by banning the label altogether.
See, e.g., Romano, 834 F.2d at 530 (nature of fiduciary duty owed will vary depending on
relationship between broker and investor); Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 953 (degree of broker's duty
to customer depends on sophistication of customer and his ability to understand potential risks
of particular transaction).
One common solution to the problem of determining the content of legal duties created by
broker-customer relations has been the development of fixed categories of relationships, carrying
relatively well-defined sets of duties. The most familiar effort of this type is the distinction
between "discretionary" trading accounts, where the market professional directs investment
decisions, and "nondiscretionary" accounts where the customer retains control over trading
decisions. These distinctions must be seen, however, more as administrative expedients, valuable
to the courts in setting initial expectations, rather than as hard and fast lines defining protected
interests. It commonly happens that courts search out and find special circumstances narrowing
or broadening the scope of an investor's protected interests. This phenomenon emphasizes,
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specific duties have developed from the "shingle theory," the principle
requiring fair dealing by securities dealers, 2 and others have arisen under
again, the thirst for facts that most courts have when approaching questions of the existence
and scope of duties labelled as fiduciary. See, e.g., Romano, 834 F.2d at 530; Leib, 461 F.
Supp. at 953.
Among the more thoughtful analyses of the sources and content of fiduciary duties are J.
SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 96-110 (1981) (defining the fiduciary relationship as one
where one person acquires powers to act with respect to another's affairs in circumstances
where the powers are obtained subject to the condition that they be exercised to benefit another,
a so-called "encumbered power"); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 802-04
(1983) (finding that the modern phenomena of increasingly greater specialization of knowledge
and the development of systemic inequalities of information and access to information creates
classes of persons who must "entrust" their well-being to others, and that the necessity of
entrustment should create protectable reliance interests); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Anal-
ysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 914-15. DeMott's article gives the particularly
helpful insight that most satisfactory explanations of the fiduciary relation are descriptive.
DeMott emphasizes the importance of analyzing particular relations to arrive at specific re-
quirements of the fiduciary duty in setting of a given relationship. DeMott explains the fiduciary
duty as follows:
Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that enables the law
to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person's
discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's rela-
tionship with another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion
about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained.
Id. at 915. See also Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries,
3 CARDozo L. REV. 519 (1982) (book review of J. SHEPHERD, supra). Both DeMott and
Jacobson conclude that efforts at more abstract formulations, whether Scott's theory of
voluntary assumption or Shepherd's theory of encumbered power, fail as analytical tools because
they, like the fiduciary label itself, tend to operate as after-the-fact explanations of decisions
and do not provide guidance to the particular content of fiduciary duties in individual cases.
See DeMott, supra, at 885-915.
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated the "shingle theory" in In re
Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). The courts adopted this theory in Charles Hughes & Co.
v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943). The heart of the theory is
that securities dealers, although trading for their own accounts and not as agents for their
customers, are under a special duty by virtue of their expertise and pivotal role in providing
public access to the markets, to deal fairly with their customers "in accordance with the
standards of the profession." Duker, 6 S.E.C. at 388. Those "standards of the profession"
are embodied in the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") which require, inter alia, that dealers not charge excessive fees for trade execution;
that sales and purchases to and from a dealer's own inventory be at fair prices; that quoted
prices be honored, and that purchase and sale recommendations reflect a reasonable belief that
the proposed transactions are suitable for the customer, representing neither excessive trading
("churning") nor overly risky trading. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §§ 1-6, NASD
MANUAL (CCH) 2151-56 (1989).
The Securitiq '-"hange Act of 1934 may provide remedies for a dealer's failure to compl.
with duties under the "shingle theory," but the interaction of an array of federal court decisions
has made this less likely and increased the importance of NASD tribunals in adjudicating
violations of the Rules of Fair Practice. Among the rulings narrowing access to 1934 Act
remedies for violations of broker and dealers' duties are: (1) the Supreme Court's requirement
that scienter be established to make recovery under Rule lOb-5 available, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976); (2) the Supreme Court's denial of actions under Rule
1990] BROKER AND DEALER DUTIES 711
common law agency principles. 3 The fiduciary duty is imprecise, however,
and often creates expectations of levels of service and methods of dealing
which may not fit comfortably with the market roles of brokers and dealers.
These expectations are nonetheless the source of continual pressure for the
expansion of the market responsibilities of brokers and dealers beyond the
range of recognized duties, especially in a regulatory culture that insists on
holding accountable those who provide public access to investment markets.
There are two main risks which result from relying on a tool as powerful
and amenable as the fiduciary principle to establish a foundation for broker
and dealer duties. First, it invites the creation of extravagant duties. 4 Second,
lOb-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty unless the culpable act involved deception or manipulation,
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-75 (1977) (followed by Shivangi v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,142, at 95,639
(D. Miss. June 20, 1986)); and (3) the decisions holding that breaches of the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice are not actionable under Rule lOb-5 unless there is fraud, Clark v. John Lamula
Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir. 1978) (10b-5 action permitted where the conduct
that breached the rule was also fraudulent under the federal securities laws). Moreover, the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, in Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), and the unwillingness of the courts to allow implied rights
of action under section 15(c) of the 1934 Act-the section specifically prohibiting fraudulent
and manipulative practices by brokers and dealers, for example, as in Asch v. Philips, Appel
& Walden, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,196, at 91,718 (2d
Cir. Feb. 9, 1989)-have caused the resolution of dealer cases to be shifted to disciplinary
tribunals of the NASD.
Some broker and dealer duties arising under the "shingle theory" are the subject of specific
federal regulation, and accordingly can give rise to enforcement actions under the 1934 Act.
See, e.g., General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule lOb-10, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1989) (duty to disclose mark-ups and status as principal or market maker
in transaction); Rule 15cl-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1989) (specific prohibition against
churning of discretionary accounts); Rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1989) (requirement
that broker-dealer have information available with respect to securities for which they quote
prices); Proposed Penny Stock Rule, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,352,
at 89,693 (Feb. 8, 1989) (proposed 1934 Act Rule 15c2-6 requiring that broker-dealer gather
information which permits fair assessment of a customer's suitability for trading risky "penny
stocks").
3. For descriptions of the agency relationship of a broker to its customer, see Marchese
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984) (securities broker stands in
fiduciary relationship with his customers and is held to utmost good faith which requires full
and fair disclosure of all material facts); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937)
(broker is an agent who is bound to act for his customer and not to betray, to others,
information he learns through his duties). The essential fiduciary character of the relation is
widely assumed, stemming from the existence of the agency relation itself. See, e.g., Hughes
v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (broker acting as fiduciary must actually disclose
material facts to ones she is being paid to protect, her willingness to divulge information will
not suffice); see generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 958-68 (1983).
4. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Boeck, 127 Wis. 2d 127, 377 N.W.2d 604
(1985), is a particularly good example of a decision shaped by the fear that the assertion of a
fiduciary relation between investor and broker could lead to extravagant expectations. The court
in Boeck first stated that the basic relationship of a broker to a sophisticated customer who
retained trading control of his account was not fiduciary. Id. at 131, 377 N.W.2d at 609. The
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the choice of an exacting model of accountability can, by itself, invite
carelessness by courts and regulators in thinking through the soundness of
specific proposed duties.5 The purpose of this Article is to stress the need
for grounding broker-dealer duties in sound, articulated understandings of
the investment markets, as well as defensible statements of the responsibilities
and expectations of both customers and market professionals. This important
need will be demonstrated through the use of several cases illustrating
problematical or failed processes by which broker-dealer duties have been
established.
plaintiff had argued that the broker's ongoing practice of offering incidental advice and counsel
with respect to commodities investments had created an obligation to inform him of a material,
revised soybean crop estimate known to the broker, especially since that estimate was completely
at odds with information the broker had given him two days before the broker received the
new forecast. The court, rejecting that theory, seemed motivated in large part by an unwillingness
to turn a jury loose with instructions on fiduciary duties, especially in view of the common
practice among stock and commodities brokers of offering incidental investment advice as a
part of their services. The court was concerned that the practice of providing incidental advice
should not become the tool for routinely imposing duties on brokers that approached those of
personal investment advisors. The decision left ample room for incidental advice to continue
without threat of application of fiduciary labels. The court seemed determined not only to
reject a fiduciary characterization of the broker-client relation, but to strictly confine the range
of special circumstances justifying expansion of duties. Id. at 133, 377 N.W.2d 609.
The concurring and dissenting opinions would have addressed the problems of jury control
and the overreaching brokerage client by deriving the content of fiduciary duties from a fair
examination of the specific facts of particular broker-client relations, and drafting corresponding
jury instructions on the scope of duties. Id. at 143-54, 377 N.W.2d at 612-18.
The most interesting aspect of Boeck is its indication of the wrangles that will almost
inevitably accompany efforts to decide whether particular relations between brokers and clients
can give rise to more expansive duties. The resolution of these questions will depend on value-
laden assessments of the relative capacities and responsibilities of customers and market profes-
sionals. For example, the dissent's conclusion in Boeck that Merrill Lynch had a clear fiduciary
duty to correct its earlier communicated forecast is based in part on the assumption that when
heightened expectations of advice and counsel are created by broadcast and print advertising
that touts the acumen and service of the brokerage house, such statements create a basis for
customer reliance and are not to be taken as mere puffery. 127 Wis. 2d at 152-53, 377 N.W.2d
at 617. For a different view, see, e.g., Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984) (use of
word "marvelous" to describe bonds did not constitute actionable misrepresentation); Rotstein
v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (statements that stock was "red
hot" and it was impossible to lose money in investment was considered puffing); Bowman v.
Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (statement that investors would make
"substantial profits without speculative risks" was puffing).
5. The adoption of a particular model of legal duties may be the first stage in determining
the scope of duties owed and may even shape eventual factfindings, a phenomenon revealingly
explored in Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 60, 73 (1956).
For an early, wry comment on the aggressive expansion of duties under the "shingle theory,"
originally so tentatively propounded, see Loss, Duke University School of Law: Conference on
Securities Regulation, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 238 (1965) (book review of conference devoted to
discussion of increasingly higher standard of conduct imposed on broker-dealers).
BROKER AND DEALER DUTIES
This Article will focus primarily on two recent decisions, In re E.F. Hutton
& Co.,6 and Wasnick v. Refco, Inc.,7 both of which have been &riticized for
inappropriately expanding broker and dealer duties.' Each decision is better
understood, however, as a case where the creation of a sound substantive
duty becomes suspect because of the failure to state a wholly persuasive
foundation for the establishment of that duty.
Hutton and Wasnick have been chosen because the facts and processes
of their decisions contain helpful clues for the development of a sound
approach to the definition of broker and dealer duties against a vague
fiduciary background. Hutton will be emphasized in particular because it
permits discussion of the creation of an apparently controversial duty and
illustrates the misapplication of a fiduciary model. What is most interesting
about Hutton is that a duty of disclosure, although quite reasonable in fact
and ultimately endorsed by the defendant, generated enormous controversy
because of the rationale offered for the creation of that duty. Ultimately,
the Article emphasizes the need for care in adequately grounding proposed
duties, and the threat of lost legitimacy when duties seem suspect.
Hutton and Wasnick are also notable because they do not involve the
common instances of self-dealing or failure to perform easily implied obli-
gations. In Wasnick, a federal district court found that a commodities broker 9
had an obligation to protect a customer from that customer's proclivity for
erratic and irrational trading.10 Wasnick imposes a duty which has only
uncertain support in existing commodities legislation, case law, and industry
practices. The opinion fails to make the case that a special duty to protect
a client from self-destruction can co-exist with the narrower vision of duties
reflected in current commodities regulation. Neither does the case show that
the narrower view of brokers' duties reflected in those regulations is itself
unreasonable. Such a showing might have been made, and the survival of
6. Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,303 (SEC July 6, 1988).
7. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
24, 1988).
8. See, e.g., Angrist, Stop Him Before He Trades Again, Brokers Are Told By A Federal
Judge, Wall St. J., May 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 (article about Wasnick); Securities Industry
Association, SEC Affirms NASD Decision: Broker-Dealers Must Give Priority to Customers'
Limit Orders Unless Prior Disclosure and Agreement, in Legal Alert (July 15, 1988) (article
about Hutton).
9. In commodities transactions, those who perform the tasks corresponding to those of
stock brokers are properly called "agents" or "associated persons." This Article will adopt
the common practice of referring to them as commodities "brokers." See, e.g., United States
v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1985); P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION 101 (1982).
10. Briefly, liability in Wasnick was based on the broker's actual knowledge of the customer's
obsessive pursuit of an approach to trading that was inevitably destructive and wholly without
reason, even in a trading environment known for irrational schemes and losing strategies that
sometimes work.
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the duties in Wasnick may require that it yet be made."' The teaching of
Wasnick is that if courts intervene to propose seemingly marginal duties in
a highly regulated setting, they must demonstrate how the duties they seek
to impose fit into a sound model of accountability for brokers and dealers.
Similarly, Hutton is a case where a seemingly unanticipated duty was
imposed upon a broker-dealer. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "Commission") sustained a finding that an over-the-counter
("OTC") market maker had an obligation to inform its customer, prior to
engaging in normal buying and selling of securities as a dealer, while awaiting
a movement in market price that would permit execution of the customer's
order to buy or sell the same securities. Hutton was adamant that its conduct
was necessary to its role as a market maker in the OTC market, a position
that seemed supported by earlier policy statements of the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 2
This Article will begin with a rather detailed description of the Hutton
litigation as it unfolded. Next, the aftermath of Hutton and a market-based
alternative argument for the disclosure of the limit order execution policy
required by Hutton will be discussed. Finally, the Article will review Hutton
in the context of other litigation, focusing in particular on the expansion of
a commodities broker's duty to the customer resulting from Wasnick.
I. THE HUTTON LITIGATION
The historical setting of the Hutton litigation helps to explain its evolution.
The Hutton case 3 arose during a period when both the SEC and the NASD
were endeavoring to eliminate the last vestiges of self-serving practices by
OTC dealers, and to bring the norms of exchange-based trading to the OTC
markets to the greatest extent possible. 4 Moreover, public confidence in
11. The appeal in Wasnick is currently pending in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 24, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-4346 (9th Cir. May 31, 1989).
12. The NASD, formed pursuant to section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 780 (1982), is the self-regulatory body charged with disciplining and setting standards
of professional conduct for broker-dealers trading in the over-the-counter ("OTC") market.
Section 15A of the Exchange Act also sketches out the structure of a substantive code of
conduct for broker-dealers now embodied in the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice.
13. In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1987-88 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988). Disciplinary proceedings against NASD
member broker-dealers under the association's Rules of Fair Practice are heard first by District
Business Conduct Committees. Decisions made by that committee may then be appealed first
to the NASD Board of Governors, then to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
ultimately to the United States Court of Appeals either for the District of Columbia Circuit or
for the circuit in which the complaining party has his residence or principal place of business.
NASD Code of Procedure, arts. II, Ill, NASD MANuAL (CCH) 3023-50; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 15A(h), 25, 15 U.S.C. §§ 780-3(h), (y) (1982).
14. See Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self-
Improvement, 70 VA. L. REv. 785, 789-99 (1984) (creation of national market system assured
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securities and commodities markets had been eroded by the October 1987
market crash and by continuing reports of misconduct by market profes-
sionals. 5 The courts, the SEC, and the self-regulatory organs of the securities
and commodities industries were motivated to restore that confidence. In
such a climate the practices of market professionals were under suspicion,
practicability of executing investors' orders for best price, more efficient transactions, fair
competition and timely information both for exchange-traded and OTC stocks); Poser, Restruc-
turing the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 883, 896-901 (1981) (customers used OTC traders to avoid minimum commission rates
charged by NYSE institutional brokers; this switch ultimately lead to a greater equality of
transaction fees in the two markets); Simon & Colby, The National Market System for Over-
The-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17, 91-102 (1986) (both NASD and Congress
emphasized fiduciary responsibilities of broker-dealers in order to reduce following abuses:
dealers violating orders by filling orders at inferior prices, and dealers preferring own shares
over customers). See also C. WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 335-427 (1975); Jennings,
Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 668 (1964) (descriptions of the early and persistent concern
that "clubby" values on the exchanges and in investment banking circles were inconsistent with
the public importance of the capital markets).
A frequent question posed in discussions of the SEC's regulation of trading markets is
whether the agency has either the will to challenge existing market institutions or the resources
to undertake the studies needed to produce reforms responsive to the best functioning of the
different types of exchange and inter-dealer markets. See, e.g., J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF WALL STREET 265-89, 439-568 (1982); see also Werner, The SEC as a Market
Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 773-74 (1984).
15. Recently, the issue of public confidence in the securities markets has been frequently
addressed by representatives of the securities industry and regulatory communities. For example
the New York Times published the following comments:
The flight of individual investors worries the securities industry to a degree unpar-
alleled since the early 50's, when the New York Stock Exchange launched a campaign
urging small investors to 'Own Your Share of American Business.'
'I think everybody is concerned about the flight of the small investor-the S.E.C.,
the exchanges, everyone,' says Howard L. Kramer, assistant director of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's division of market regulation. Kramer notes that
without the liquidity provided by small orders, it is much more difficult for specialists
and other market makers to do their jobs.
Govoni, In the Market: Fear of Buying, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, § 6 (The Business World),
pt. 2, at 55, col. 1.
A recent report by the Securities Industry Association notes that the small individual investor
may have withdrawn from .the market because of this loss of confidence. The disappearance
of individual traders from the market has caused fears that market liquidity might be impaired
and that the risks of market specialists might be increased by the absence of a broad base of
active investors at all stages of a market. Power, Small Investors are Punier Than Many Think,
Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
On the general issue of current public confidence in the securities markets and in the integrity
of market professionals, see also A Report by the Division of Market Regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, The October 1987 Market Break, in Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
Special Report (CCH) (Feb. 1988); Ricks, Many Crash Complaints Unresolved-Firms Don't
Respond Well to Small Investor Problems, Report Says, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1988, at Cl, col.
6 (describing report by the North American Securities Administrators Association and rebuttal
effort by the Securities Industry Association); Wall Street's Credibility Gap, Wall St. J., Nov.
23, 1987, sec. C, at 29.
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and the need for improved accountability seemed obvious.16 This may explain
why each tribunal which heard the facts in Hutton was unresponsive to
defense efforts to argue that the dynamics of the market and the special
risks undertaken by market makers in OTC stocks should be considered in
determining the content of a market maker's duties with respect to the
execution of customer orders.
A. The Precipitating Events in Hutton and the Complaint to the
National Association of Securities Dealers
On January 11, 1984, William Manning, an experienced investment advisor
and president of a company that managed more than $1.4 billion in assets, 7
placed a limit order with E.F. Hutton for his own account to sell in the
OTC market 5,000 shares of Genex Corporation common stock ("Genex"
or "Genex common") at a price of 17 1/8.18 The limit order meant that
Manning wanted his shares sold at a fixed minimum price rather than at the
market price. Therefore, whenever the bidding interest for Genex produced
a market maker's bid of 17 1/8 per share, Hutton would be obligated to
execute Mr. Manning's sale order.
At the time Hutton received Mr. Manning's limit order, the "inside" price
quotation for Genex common appearing on the NASDAQ system 19 was "17
16. The securities regulation community has never quite made its peace with the seemingly
necessary expedient of permitting market makers and dealers to perform brokerage functions.
See Mayer, Broker-Dealer Firms, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET-CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
SECURITIES MARKETS (A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT) 433, 476-81 (1980). The earliest
version of the 1934 Act would have separated the two roles. See H.R. 9323, § 11, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). Unease about the possibilities
for abuse when securities professionals perform both brokerage and market making functions
has affected federal securities regulation and generated adverse comment from the earliest days.
See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, Stock 'Brokers' as Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46, 49-53
(1933). This concern has been a major engine for reforming the practices of dealers. In particular,
it has generated a body of regulations requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest and of
information about transactions which are seen as vulnerable to self-preferencing. The unwill-
ingness to divide brokerage and dealer functions has generated a regulatory approach more
disposed to compel disclosure of conflicts than to compel cessation of the split loyalties that
give rise to the conflicts. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE
SEC, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, ch. VII, at 610-53 (1963) [hereinafter
SPECIAL STUDY].
17. Manning's firm commonly placed 40-50 buy or sell orders on a given business day.
Those orders included limit order transactions. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099,
at 2 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors of the NASD).
18. The reconstruction of the facts appearing here is based on the reported decisions of the
NASD Board of Governors and the SEC and on agreed-upon facts described in briefs in the
Hutton litigation. Respondent's Brief at 12-17, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No. 3-6490)
(SEC Sept. 23, 1985).
19. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation system ("NAS-
DAQ") is the electronic interdealer quotation system for OTC stocks, providing access to
quotations of all market makers trading securities listed on the system. For a description of
the NASDAQ system and of the different levels of access to its quotations. See Simon & Colby
supra note 14, at 34-44.
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bid, 17 1/8 asked." An "inside" price represents the best purchase and sale
price available to professional dealers from other professional dealers making
a market in a given security. 0 Hutton was one of nine dealers making a
market in Genex, 21 but none of those dealers, including Hutton, would pay
more than 17 for Genex common at the time Manning placed his order.
Hutton's own prices to the inter-dealer market were "17 bid, 17 1/2 asked,"
reflecting a somewhat higher price for sales of Genex by Hutton than the
best price available in the market. 22 The relevant price for execution of
Manning's order, however, was the "bid" price, 23 and no one bid more than
17 for Genex while Manning's limit order was outstanding.
While Hutton held Manning's sell order, it continued its activities as a
market maker in Genex common, buying and selling from its own inventory
to other dealers and retail customers. On January 11 and 12, 1984, Hutton
sold 4,755 shares of Genex from its own inventory at prices ranging between
17 1/4 to 17 1/2, the "ask" prices for Genex. Meanwhile, the Manning sell
order remained unexecuted, awaiting an upward movement on the "bid"
side of the market which would indicate the willingness of some market
maker somewhere to pay as much as 17 1/8 for Genex common. Unfortu-
nately, the hoped-for-increase in the "bid" price never occurred. At no time
after Hutton's receipt of Manning's order did the "inside" bid price for
Genex exceed $17 per share. Worse still, in the late morning of January 12,
20. Hutton, Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,327 (July 6, 1988).
21. Id.
22. Such discrepancies are not uncommon in the OTC market. These discrepancies can
reflect such things as the relative liquidity of the market maker, the market maker's assessment
of the risk associated with holding certain inventories, and the rate of turnover the market
maker experiences for particular stocks. See Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in
MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 67 (1985)
[hereinafter Stoll, Alternative Views]; Stoll, The Pricing of Security Dealer Services: An Em-
pirical Study of NASDAQ Stocks, 33 J. FIN. 1153, 1161-66 (1978) [hereinafter Stoll, Pricing
of Dealer Services]. See also Ho & Stoll, The Dynamics of Dealer Markets Under Competition,
38 J. FIN. 1053, 1060-67 (1983).
There was evidence, however, that it was Hutton's practice when executing transactions
involving 1000 or more shares, to execute customer orders at the "inside" bid or ask price
even though its own bid or ask price might be less attractive. A Hutton executive testified that
Manning would have received at least partial execution had the "inside" bid price reached
Manning's desired price of 17 1/8. See Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 3
(Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors of the NASD).
23. All dealers maintain a differential, represented by "bid" and "ask" quotations, between
the price they are willing to pay for customers' stock and the price at which they are willing
to make that same stock available to nondealer buyers in the market. The argument for this
differential is simply that the gap between the "bid" and "ask" prices represents the market
maker's profit. The differential compensates the market maker for continually exposing his
capital by standing willing to buy and sell for his own account to provide a market for others.
If a selling limit order customer were instead granted execution at the "ask" price at which
the market maker sells the same stock to the public, the executing market maker would thereby
be deprived of the profit represented by the mark up included in the "ask" price.
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the day following Manning's order, the market for Genex fell off sharply,
so that Hutton never executed the order.
Manning later reviewed the published NASDAQ quotations listing "ask"
prices of 17 1/4 and 17 1/2 for January 11 and 12, and discovered that
Hutton had sold for its own account at these prices while his own order at
17 1/8 languished. Consequently, Manning complained to the NASD that
Hutton had misappropriated his own sales opportunity. 24 However, the
NASD's counsel wrote in reply, indicating that Hutton had done nothing
wrong.
25
24. Letter from William Manning to Gordon Macklin, President, NASD (Jan. 26, 1984).
25. The NASD's counsel's letter stated in relevant part:
The NASDAQ market is composed of independent competitive market makers each
maintaining a bid price and an offer price .... Therefore if you place an order
with a firm to sell stock at a price, the only way the firm would be able to access
other markets to fill that order [i.e., find market makers willing to buy the
customer's stock] is if there was a market maker willing to buy at that price ....
Turning to the particulars of your sell order of 5,000 shares at 17 1/8, according
to NASD records at no time during the afternoon of the I lth or the entire day of
the 12th was any market maker willing to buy shares of Genex at 17 1/8. Therefore
E.F. Hutton could not have accessed other market makers to fill your order.
Letter from Frank J. Wilson, Executive Vice President, Legal and Compliance, NASD to
William Manning (March 22, 1984). The letter continued, addressing the specific question of
whether Hutton, as a Genex market maker who was also Manning's broker, might have violated
duties to Manning by continuing to trade on its own behalf while Manning's order went
unexecuted:
With respect to your question relating to E.F. Hutton's transactions on the 1 1th
and 12th it is true that E.F. Hutton did execute sale transactions at prices of
17 1/8 on the 11th and 17 1/8 and 17 1/4 on the 12th. However, under the
established custom and usage in the over-the-counter market, and the Association's
rules, its members are not required to always sell customers' securities ahead of
their own sales from market maker positions in which they may have substantial
risks.
Id. (emphasis added).
The position adopted in the letter, that Mr. Manning's rights were circumscribed by practices
built into the structure of the OTC market and that these practices were reasonable, is also
reflected in a consumer information publication by the NASD. NASD, TRADING IN THE
NASDAQ NATIONAL MARKET: A QUESTION AND ANSWER GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES (1983) (available in Respondent's Brief, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No.
3-6490) (SEC Sept. 23, 1985)). This publication contains the following question and answer
presentation of the limit order execution problem:
Q: At 10:30 a.m .... my registered representative told me that a transaction in
EFGH stock had taken place at 40 1/4. 1 told him to sell 100 shares for me at that
price. My order was never executed. Why?
A: The inside market was probably 40 bid - 40 1/4 offered which means that the
40 1/4 transaction mentioned by your registered representative was more than likely
a customer buying from a market maker at his offer of 40 1/4. As a customer
selling EFGH stock, your transaction would have to take place at the market
maker's bid-the price at which he buys from you for his own account.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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B. The Proceedings
1. The Case Brought Before the District Business Conduct Committee
Despite his initial discouragement, Mr. Manning persevered. Supported by
a subsequent letter from the NASD's General Counsel, which adopted a less
categorical view of Manning's claim, 26 Mr. Manning filed a formal complaint
with the District Business Conduct Committee ("District Committee") of
the NASD, in early June of 1984.27 The complaint restated Manning's basic
challenge to Hutton's practice of "trading through" its customer's order.
Manning claimed that by accepting his order, Hutton undertook a fiduciary
duty to represent him in the marketplace, and breached that duty by not
giving his order priority in both time and price over Hutton's own trans-
actions.2" In the complaint he insisted that where a market maker undertakes
a broker's duties, the agency relationship of broker to customer requires
either that the market maker cease to trade on its own behalf on terms not
available to its brokerage customer, or that the broker grant the customer
priority by trading the customer's shares under terms customarily available
only to market makers. Manning further asserted that the brokerage rela-
tionship should be the exclusive context for defining a market maker's duties
when performing brokerage functions. 29
Hutton maintained that its duty to Manning was limited to an obligation
to sell his stock in a normal OTC brokerage transaction. Hutton argued that
it had neither an obligation to execute the order at other than a "bid" price
of 17 1/8, nor a duty to advise Manning of the fact that it engaged in
trading as a market maker while representing its clients as a broker. 0 Hutton
further argued that its transactions neither appropriated Manning's sales
opportunity nor prejudiced the trade execution that he might have received
had Hutton not traded as a market maker." Rather, Hutton argued, it had
26. Letter from Frank J. Wilson, Executive Vice President and General Counsel to William
Manning (April 16, 1984). The letter emphasized that the scope of particular broker duties was
highly dependent on the specific facts of given cases, and encouraged Mr. Manning to pursue
his action.
27. See Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 2 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of
Governors of the NASD) (complaint was filed on June 4, 1984).
28. Id.
29. The complaint challenged fundamentally the view expressed in the NASD communica-
tions that a market maker's duty to its brokerage customers consists of a duty to execute
customer transactions when the offered bid price permits, and does not require that he suspend
his market making activities or grant his customer access to the special trading advantages
enjoyed by market makers. For a description of the features of a diffuse, interdealer market
which arguably entitle market makers to the spreads represented by gaps between bid and ask
prices, see infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
30. See Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. No. NY-2099, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1985) (Board of
Governors Decision); Respondent's Brief at 21-26, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No. 3-6490)
(SEC Sept. 23, 1985).
31. Brief at 21-26.
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simply performed the market maker's normal function of executing the
market orders of others on an ongoing basis at "bid" and "ask" prices
while awaiting market conditions permitting execution of Manning's limit
order. Therefore, according to Hutton, Manning claimed a form of trade
execution that threatened market usages essential to Hutton's role as a market
maker.
Hutton also argued that the prevailing customs, usages and rules of the
market became implied terms of the contract between broker and customer,
delimiting customer rights and broker duties.12 The acceptance of this prin-
ciple is always subject to the condition that such customs and usages be
neither against public policy, nor at odds with a prior, contrary agreement
between broker and customer.3 Hutton, and the Securities Industry Asso-
ciation ("SIA") in its amicus brief,34 argued, however, that the practice of
market makers' continuing to trade for their own accounts while holding
customer limit orders reflected the underlying dynamics of the OTC market
and should properly be deemed an implied element of Hutton's contract
with its customer. 35
The heart of Hutton's argument was that a market maker is entitled to
continue selling at the "ask" price while customers await a favorable move-
ment in the bid price because the market maker is exposed to the risk of
carrying inventory. The market maker carries inventory because of its obli-
gation to stand ready to deliver shares to buyers in the market when other
sellers may not be present.36 That market risk is addressed only in part by
allowing the market maker to collect the spread between "bid" and "ask"
prices. That spread not only provides a mechanism for profit, it also im-
plicitly creates a limited right to priority in time that allows the market
maker to sell all its own inventory at the inside "ask" price, while it sells
retail customers inventories only when the bid price permits. Thus, Hutton
argued, and was well supported by standard interpretations of the market,
that retail customers must await a favorable bid for their shares, even as
32. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Release Act No., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 84,303, at 89,327 (July 6, 1988). See, e.g., C. MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS
AND STOCK EXCHANGES § 157 (1931); W. PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT 8 (2d American ed. 1840); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 96,
199 (1844); F. WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 232, 235, 239, 760 (1876).
33. See C. MEYER, supra note 32, at 160-63.
34. Brief of the Securities Industry Association as amicus curiae, Manning v. E.F. Hutton
& Co. (No. 3-6490) (SEC Jan. 10, 1985).
35. Their belief was in part grounded on past statements by the NASD and the Commission
and in part on their understanding of the unique risks and market dynamics of the OTC
markets, conditions which in their judgment should be the most important context for the
development of NASD and Commission trade execution policies. The amicus brief of the SIA
indicated that both the NASD and the SEC seemed to have regarded market maker trading
priority as an endemic element of the OTC market. Id. at 19-25.
36. Indeed, such market "support" is a major expectation of underwriters of public offerings
of OTC stocks.
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the market maker may continue selling to the market at an "ask" price
higher than the customer's desired sale price. 7
The District Committee decided against Hutton, but not on Manning's
theory." Instead, it found Hutton's action justified discipline because Hutton
failed to disclose the terms under which the Manning order would be
executed.3 9 The District Committee concluded that absent a clear understand-
ing with a customer, a dealer should not buy or sell for its own account at
prices more favorable than the customer's limit order unless the dealer
executed the limit order first.
4 0
The District Committee's decision seems inspired by the principle of agency
law that prohibits an agent from competing with its principal with respect
to the subject matter of the agency without the principal's agreement. 41
However, this principle does not clearly apply to the facts of Hutton,
compelling such disclosure. Hutton, as previously noted, had argued and
was to maintain throughout the litigation, that its trading in a parallel inter-
dealer market at prices to which its customer had no right of access simply
did not constitute direct competition nor deprive Manning of the execution
37. See Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note 22, at 1162-71. Other possible balances
between a dealer's selfishness and selflessness might be struck. The market maker might be
required to execute the customer's limit order in preference to his own trades, charging only
an ordinary broker's commission. Such a balance seems inappropriate if we accept the validity
of the spread between "bid" and "ask" prices as representing compensation for some real
market risk for which the market maker should be compensated. See, e.g., In re Peter J. Kisch,
No. 19005 (SEC Aug. 24, 1982) (acknowledging right of integrated broker-dealer, functioning
as both broker and market maker, to collect spread as compensation). See infra notes 88-110
and accompanying text, for a complete discussion of this issue.
Similarly, if Hutton had matched Manning's sell order at 17 1/8 with some of the incoming
buy orders at 17 1/4, granting Manning execution while Hutton pocketed the 1/8 point spread
as its transaction fee, Hutton would have been exposed to the risk that if buyers were scarce
in the market, Hutton may have been left with unsalable inventory if it had executed Manning's
order first. Alternatively, the market maker might be permitted to act completely selfishly,
continuing to sell out his own inventory in preference to his customer's trades even after the
"bid" price had reached the customer's desired sales level. Such a rule of no-priority-at-all for
the customer's limit order would allow the market maker to appropriate all sales opportunities
at a given price level. It would negate the obligation undertaken by the market maker when it
accepted the customer's limit order to execute that order at the stated price. Such a breach of
an undertaking to sell at an offered price is also inconsistent with Article III, Section 6 of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, supra note 2, at 2156.
These possible variations on the selfishness of a market maker suggest that the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate expectations with respect to trade execution depends on the
market position and market risks of broker-dealers and customers, respectively. An approach
appropriate to the OTC market is suggested infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
38. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 3 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors
of the NASD).
39. Id. ("when a member accepts a limit order, it assumes an obligation of fair dealing
which requires that there be a clear understanding with the client as to the manner in which
the order will be handled").
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 comment a (1959).
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to which he was entitled. 42 Indeed, unless the District Committee intended
to challenge the "bid" and "ask" price structure of the OTC market, it had
no basis for the charge that Hutton's proprietary sales had appropriated
Manning's sales opportunity, and thus had given rise to a disclosure obli-
gation. Moreover, there was no evidence that Hutton had abused its position
as a market maker to prevent Manning's access to the market. Certainly,
instances will arise where "bid" and "ask" prices are the creatures of a
market maker's manipulative bidding rather than of broader based market
activity, 4 so that a market maker can prevent a customer's sales price from
ever being reached. In Hutton, however, there was no suggestion that Hutton
so dominated the Genex market that it prevented the market "bid" price
from reaching Manning's target price."4
The rapid falling off of Genex trading following Hutton's trades suggests
another concern that may have informed the District Committee's decision.
If a market maker were aware of an impending decline, it might sell ahead
of its customer in order to liquidate its own risk in a thin market that could
not absorb both the customer's and the market maker's sales.45 However,
the District Committee, and later the NASD Board of Governors, absolved
Hutton of any such willful wrongdoing. 46
A final argument that could have been advanced for imposing a disclosure
duty on Hutton might have been that its failure to disclose its intention of
"trading through" Manning's order deprived Manning of the opportunity
to retain another broker who might have offered superior trade execution.
The District Committee did not, however, address this argument directly in
its opinion. The idea permeates the subsequent stages of the litigation, always
hinted at as a possible reason for compelling a duty to disclose, but never
satisfactorily analyzed. 47
42. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 3 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors
of the NASD).
43. See Alstead, Strangis & Dempsey, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 20,825, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,607, at 86,740 (Apr. 5, 1984); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc.,
21 S.E.C. 865, 874 (1946). For a description of the uncertainties of proving cases of market
domination and for a criticism of the SEC's willingness to infer fraud and manipulation from
the fact that market making in a given stock is dominated by one or a handful of dealers, see
Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the Delicate Art-Control and Domination
in Over-The-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DUKE L.J. 196.
44. Hutton was one of nine dealers making a market in Genex. There seems to have been
agreement that Hutton did not dominate the Genex market. See generally E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,303 (July 6, 1988).
45. See, e.g., In re Shearson, Hammill & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 7743, [1965
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,306, at 82,518-19 (Jan. 12, 1965) (broker sold
own shares at price from 14 1/2 to 15 before selling customers' shares for below 12).
46. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 6 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors
of the NASD).
47. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,329 (July 6, 1988).
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The essential point is that none of the arguments for establishing either a
lost trading opportunity for Manning or a breach of duty by Hutton was
adequately made during the District Committee proceedings. The charges
were, at this stage of the litigation, chiefly substantiated by a vaguely
articulated vision of what a broker's fiduciary duties should be. In any
event, the District Committee concluded that Hutton's actions had violated
its obligation of fair dealing with its customer, and therefore issued Hutton
a letter of caution as a sanction. 48
2. Hutton's Appeal to the NASD Board of Governors
The District Committee's problematic handling of Manning's "lost op-
portunity" was repeated by the NASD Board of Governors. 49 First, the
Board of Governors found that although the bid price for Genex stock had
indeed never reached Manning's target price of 17 1/8, Hutton still had a
duty to disclose the terms under which Manning's order would have been
executed. This duty was grounded, in part, on a finding that Mr. Manning,
although sophisticated and generally knowledgeable about the operation of
the OTC market, had never fully appreciated that a market maker who was
also a broker could properly continue trading for its own account while
holding a customer's unexecuted limit order.50 However, to establish such a
duty to disclose, the Board of Governors also needed to conclude that
Hutton's failure to tell Manning about its limit order execution policy may
have made some difference-either by appropriating a trading opportunity
or by causing Manning to forego better chances elsewhere. In denying these
charges, Hutton relied principally on two things. One was the admitted fact
that the market "bid" price had never reached 17 1/8. The other was the
argument that the prevailing practice by market makers was to trade contin-
ually for their own accounts while holding customer limit orders, only
executing those limit orders when the "bid" prices established by normal
market movement permitted execution."
The Board of Governors rejected, out of hand and without analysis,
Hutton's argument that its practices conformed with prevailing industry
practice. The Board stated, "Hutton further contends that its actions were
consistent with standard industry practice in situations such as this. We are
48. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY 2099, at 3 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors
of the NASD). The specific basis for the violation and sanction was Article III, Section 1 of
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, requiring that member broker-dealers "observe high standards
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." See NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, supra note 2, at 2151.10.
49. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Company, No. NY-2099, at 6 (Board of Governors of the
NASD).
50. Id. This finding was based on sharply disputed testimony. Indeed the evidence supporting
Manning's claim of ignorance was highly equivocal, requiring a rather determined reading to
support a finding for him.
51. Id. at 2, 6.
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unable to conclude that this is the case." '5 2 The hasty rejection was inappro-
priately abrupt in view of the position reflected both in published NASD
materials and in the original letter by the General Counsel to Manning. 3
The Board's decision made clear that even if Hutton had acted in conformity
with industry practice, Hutton would nonetheless have faced discipline be-
cause the practice itself was inconsistent with Hutton's fiduciary duty unless
previously disclosed.5
4
The position adopted by the Board of Governors would be more easily
acceptable were it merely a prophylactic measure intended to assure that
brokerage customers will be routinely alerted to the inherent conflicts of
interest of broker/market makers. This would warn brokerage customers of
possible abuses such as a market maker's bailing out of a falling market.
But a disciplinary proceeding against an individual broker-dealer, resulting
in a letter of censure, hardly seems the occasion for promoting such broad
policy objectives, at least where proof of misconduct has not been established
and where the defendant relied upon a seemingly well-accepted conception
of its duties to its customers.55 Evident in the Board of Governors' statement
52. Id. at 6.
53. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
54. According to the Board of Governors:
Even if Hutton's actions had constituted normal industry practice, which we do
not believe it does, we conclude that a member's obligation to deal fairly with its
customers and the fiduciary relationship assumed in accepting a customer's limit
order require that, before the obligation inherent in that relationship can in any
way be modified, there must be a clear and unequivocal understanding between the
member and the customer as to the extent of the modification. . . . We believe that
this conclusion is supported by general principles of agency law as well as the
precedent provided both in decisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the courts as well as by practices in the securities industry. Of equal importance
.. . is the overriding obligation of Association members to deal fairly with their
customers. We do not believe complainant was treated fairly in this case. Respon-
dent, therefore, violated its fiduciary duty to its customer.
Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 6 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors of
the NASD) (emphasis added).
Perhaps the most telling portion of the decision is the phrase "before the obligation inherent
in that relationship can in any way be modified." Id. This phrase suggests an assumption that
the performance of ordinary market making functions at prices not available to brokerage
customers constitutes per se a dilution of the order execution services which the customer could
legitimately expect when a market maker functions as a broker.
55. A perceived tendency by the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations to rely on
prosecutions rather than on formal rule development to institute regulatory policies has long
been a subject of controversy. See, e.g., Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice
Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 691, 714-19 (1964) (emphasizing that adjudication provides flexibility while
acknowledging problems arising from multiple regulatory roles of SEC); see generally R.
KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 77-245 (1982) (pointing out weakness in SEC's proce-
dure). Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
eloquently argued that the court should recognize that local circumstances of a given adjudication
might not produce the best considered policy results. He emphasized the need to balance
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is its eagerness to expand a market maker's obligations to conform with a
broadly stated and somewhat featureless conception of broker-dealer fidu-
ciary duties.
The Board of Governors' statement demonstrated this eagerness when it
found that the duty of disclosure imposed on Hutton was consistent with
well-established views of broker-dealer and market maker duties.56 However,
earlier cases which had imposed sanctions on brokers who preferred their
firms' trades to those of their customers simply do not support the Board
of Governors' view. In leading cases such as In re Investment Service Co.,
5 7
and Opper v. Hancock Securities,5" an additional element of abuse or
overreaching, distinct from the bare practice of subordination of customer
limit orders was always required to find the market maker's conduct sanc-
tionable.5 9 In both Investment Service Co. and Opper, brokers egregiously
failed to honor expressed assurances that a trade would be executed within
a given time frame without fail.6 In Opper, there was the further suggestion
of market domination and manipulation of "bid" and "ask" prices by the
market maker, preventing the customer's execution price from being at-
tained. 6' In contrast to these cases, which did not challenge limit order
subordination as such, but which relied upon other sanctionable conduct,
62
the Board of Governors in Hutton viewed the basic activity of a market
maker trading for its own account, while holding customers' limit orders,
as fundamentally inconsistent with that broker's fiduciary duties. Although
the narrow duty affirmed by the Board of Governors was a duty of disclosure,
not a duty to cease all subordination of customer limit orders, it was based
on a highly restrictive view of agency duties that did not fully acknowledge
adjudicative and administrative processes in the orderly development of policies and rules. See
H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCEs-THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS 143-45 (1962).
56. Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. NY-2099, at 6 (Feb. 12, 1985) (Board of Governors
of the NASD).
57. 41 S.E.C. 188 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Barnett v. United States, 319 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.
1963).
58. 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
59. The SEC, in its hearing of the appeal in Hutton, made much of these cases. In its
treatment of Opper, the SEC concluded wrongly that because Opper had found that "trading
ahead" was a breach of a fiduciary duty, even in a case where no special relationship of trust
had been established between dealer and customer, "trading ahead" must inevitably be regarded
as inconsistent with the most rudimentary conception of fiduciary duties. See E.F. Hutton &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,303, at 89,328, 89,330 (July 6, 1988). It may well be true that no relationship of special
trust is needed to protect a customer against abusive "trading ahead" by a dealer, but it is
also true that the conduct is not abusive in itself when the dealer's priority is simply a product
of the "bid" and "ask" price structure of the OTC market. Opper and Investment Service
Co. are consistent with such a reading.
60. See Opper, 250 F. Supp. at 673; Investment Service Co., 41 S.E.C. at 198.
61. 250 F. Supp. at 675.
62. Opper, 250 F. Supp. at 676; Investment Service Co., 41 S.E.C. at 189-98.
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that a customer's expectations may be limited by legitimate market making
activities.
The irony of the Board of Governors decision is that a close analysis of
the dynamics of the OTC market and the risk position of OTC market
makers would have supported the very disclosure duty ultimately imposed
by the Board of Governors. This disclosure duty does not arise, as the Board
of Governors would have it, from an a priori conception of an agent's
duties 3. 6 Rather, as developed in Part C of this Article, the disclosure duty
arises from an accommodation of the legitimate need for OTC market makers
to protect themselves from the special risks of standing ready to either buy
or sell in a decentralized market, and the need of the market and of its
customers to restrict the market maker's self-protective trading to the min-
imum justified by its special market position.
3. Hutton's Appeal to the SEC
A 3-2 majority of the Commission affirmed the NASD Board of Gover-
nors' decision in a de novo review, adopting the argument that Hutton's
failure to disclose its limit execution practices deprived Manning of an
opportunity to seek superior execution terms. The Commission agreed with
the Board of Governors that Hutton's practice of trading ahead of customer
limit orders without disclosure violated existing duties under the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice.61 In the Commission's view Hutton had breached an obvious
fiduciary duty. 65
63. The notice sent to NASD broker-dealers immediately after the Hutton decision dem-
onstrates the effort in the Hutton litigation to make disclosure of limit order subordination
seem an obvious duty. The notice suggested the natural provenance of Hutton's disclosure duty
from the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and from earlier interpretations of those rules. NASD
NOTICE TO MEMBERS 85-12, RE: FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS WHEN HANDLING CUS-
TOMER LIMIT ORDERS (Feb. 15, 1985).
The notice prompted a concerned letter from the Securities Industry Association, which raised
the question whether customers could reasonably expect their market making broker to cease
trading for the market maker's own account while holding a customer limit order. See Letter
from William R. Harman, Chairman, Federal Regulation Committee, Securities Industry As-
sociation to Frank J. Wilson, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers (April 17, 1985) (available in Respondent's Brief at app. 4, Manning
v. E.F. Hutton (No. 3-6490) (SEC Sept. 23, 1985)). The arguments made in the letter were
developed fully in the SIA's amicus brief in Hutton. See Brief of the Securities Industry
Association as amicus curiae, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No. 3-6490) (SEC Jan. 10,
1985).
64. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,327 (July 6, 1988).
65. The majority illustrated this insistence in the following portion of its decision:
Hutton's willingness to sell Genex stock for its own account at prices equal to or
higher than the price of Manning's limit order created a conflict between the
interests of Hutton and Manning that affected the task Hutton had undertaken on
Manning's behalf. Hutton was, in effect, competing with Manning with respect to
the subject matter of their relationship-the execution of Manning's order. As the
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Like the Board of Governors, the Commission did not genuinely engage
the question of whether the peculiar risks of the OTC markets may justify
a market maker's continual trading in the interim before a limit order strike
price is reached. Nor did the Commission satisfactorily address the issue of
whether Hutton's conduct may in fact have denied Manning a realistic chance
of obtaining other execution terms, either from Hutton or another dealer.
In the same manner as the Board of Governors, the Commissioners offered,
but failed to substantiate the argument that Hutton had "seized" Manning's
trading opportunity.6
A sound argument for compelling disclosure of execution terms was
available to the Commission, as it had been to the Board of Governors, but
the argument is different from that offered by the Commission. The argument
is not, as the Commission suggests, that Manning may have had a realistic
opportunity of negotiating superior trading terms, whether with Hutton or
with another market maker. 67 For if Hutton's subordination of Manning's
limit order execution reflected an accurate assessment of Hutton's risks of
holding an inventory and making a market in Genex common, Hutton may
not have offered Manning substantially different terms nor terms different
from those of any other market maker. 6 The rationale for disclosure is,
instead, that in a decentralized market where prices are set by market makers,
who simultaneously function as broker and dealer, rather than by an auction
process, any market maker's terms of execution must always be regarded as
suspect. The customer should have information to allow him an opportunity
to compare those terms with other available, possibly better, terms. However,
this open-ended rationale for disclosure, grounded in the decentralized struc-
facts in this case illustrate, this can result in a broker-dealer seizing a customer's
only opportunity for execution at his limit order price .... If Manning had known
.... he would have had an opportunity to ... attempt to negotiate better terms
with Hutton, or look for another broker willing to give his limit order priority in
filling incoming buy orders.
Id. 84,303, at 89,329 (emphasis added).
66. Market domination by one or a very few market makers is normally required to control
price movements so dramatically. The fact that there were nine dealers making a market in
Genex common at the time of Manning's trades, and the absence of any showing that Hutton
was a particularly dominant market maker, makes it rather unfair to assume without explanation
that Hutton's proprietary trades prevented the bid-side price movement needed by Manning.
Indeed, there was no evidence in the case of opportunistic trading by Hutton or of influence
of the movement on prices on the "bid" side of the market. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange
Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at
89,336 n.20 (July 6, 1988) (Grundfest, Comm'r, dissenting).
For a description of the phenomenon of market domination of OTC stocks, the potential
abuses that flow from domination, and the problematical aspects of establishing a case of
market domination, see Bloomenthal, supra note 43, at 205-20.
67. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,329 (July 6, 1988).
68. See infra notes 95-96. Unless, of course, Manning could have taken advantage of a less
well-informed trader.
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ture of the OTC markets, is not the argument offered by the Commission.
The Commission seems instead to have concluded that Hutton may indeed
have deprived Manning of opportunities elsewhere.
The most immediate reason the Commission was willing to conclude that
Manning may have been deprived of a real trading opportunity was Hutton's
introduction of a poorly designed study intended to justify its limit order
execution policy. 69 As previously discussed, Hutton argued throughout the
course of the litigation that its limit order execution policy conformed with
generally prevailing industry practices. Hutton attempted to substantiate this
line of defense by submitting an empirical study commissioned from Arthur
Andersen & Co.70 The study was intended to prove the generality of Hutton's
limit order execution policy, but produced highly ambiguous results. It
focused on OTC limit order execution practices in a small sample of trans-
actions placed with ten large retail brokers who made markets in the stocks
randomly selected for the study. 71 The study showed that twenty percent of
the market makers, representing twenty percent of the transactions sampled,
chose to fill incoming market "buy" orders from customer limit orders to
sell, rather than from their own inventories.72
Any hope that Hutton could establish its own practice as universal was
undone. The showing that twenty percent of market makers in the study
were willing to fill orders from the other side of the market from customer
limit orders indicated that Manning might have had some chance of finding
a market maker willing to execute his limit order in preference to the market
maker's proprietary transactions. Moreover, the study failed to show that
for the remaining eighty percent of transactions where market "buy" orders
were filled from sources other than customer limit orders, the alternative
source was the market maker's inventory and not some other source. 7 The
study as a whole failed to make Hutton's case for the universality or
generality of customer limit order subordination or the preference of dealer
proprietary trades among market makers. Even though the study contained
strong evidence supporting Hutton's broader argument that neither a cus-
tomer's limit order stock nor any other source that deprived the dealer of
his normal compensation would be the first sources used to fill a market
order, the case for routine subordination of limit orders had failed. 74
69. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
70. Arthur Andersen & Co. Limit Order Study (September 25, 1985) [hereinafter Limit
Order Study (available in Respondent's Brief, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No. 3-6490)
(SEC Sept. 23, 1985).
71. Brief at 2.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 1-2.
74. In each instance where the customer limit order was not executed but where a market
order to buy was filled by the market maker, the market maker's account executive was asked
why the limit order was not executed. In eight of the twelve instances of non-execution, the
executive replied that the limit order had not gone through because the market "bid" price
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Although the Commission did not allow admission of the study as evi-
dence,7" it seized upon the mixed findings to demonstrate that Manning may
indeed have had other, superior trade execution opportunities if Hutton had
disclosed its policies. In addition, the Commission viewed the study as
evidence that Hutton had not proved that its conduct was anything less than
a clear breach of fiduciary duties.76
The study could not have been more inappropriately used, however much
its ambiguities may have tempted the Commission. The greatest flaw in the
study is that, having selected random stocks for study by a method that did
not consider or label factors which touch on the market maker's risk in
making a market in those particular stocks, as compared with the risk of
making a market in Genex common, the study created no basis for saying
one way or the other whether Manning might have had the same, superior
or inferior execution opportunities as those existing for the stocks included
in the study. Hutton's case could only be made, or undone, by a study of
stocks with market maker risk characteristics similar to those of Genex
common.77 The unfortunate consequence of the study is that it may have
helped the Commission impose disclosure duties on Hutton for the wrong
reasons. Furthermore, it may have helped excuse the Commission from
addressing Hutton's sound argument that the fiduciary duties of market
makers should be developed with an awareness for the special risks under-
taken by market makers in the OTC markets.
The majority opinion was correct in grounding its disclosure duty on the
argument that the absence of disclosure may have deprived Manning of a
trading opportunity, but failed in assuming the reality of those opportunities.
Specific trading conditions for Genex common may well have denied any
such opportunity. The Commission, predisposed, and abetted by an ill-
considered defense tactic, resorted to pronouncements of fiduciary duties
and inappropriate reliance on earlier case authority rather than a closer
examination of market processes to develop its disclosure duty. The some-
times unfortunate effect of adopting broad scale policy positions in a liti-
gation setting could not be better demonstrated.
had never reached the limit price. This evidence indicates that a primary concern of most dealers
surveyed was to conduct trades in a way that would not deprive them of their accustomed
spreads. Id. at 2.
75. The evidence was refused because it could have been introduced, but had not been, in
the NASD Board of Governors proceeding below. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,327-
28 n.7 (July 6, 1988).
76. Id. 84,303, at 89,328-29 & n.ll.
77. Any study valid for Hutton's, or the Commission's, purposes should have isolated
factors such as the number of market makers trading a given stock, the depth and breadth of
the market for the stock, and the number and types of markets in which the stock was listed,
before concluding that the respondent's replies permitted any valid conclusions of any kind
about the likely pattern of limit order execution for Genex stock.
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a. The dissent
The 3-2 split in the Commission resulted chiefly from the dissenters'
conclusion that Mr. Manning had not shown that he reasonably could
suppose, unless Hutton informed him otherwise, that Hutton would cease
its normal market making activities while holding his limit order. 78 The
dissenters' reservations were based in part on the strong evidence of Man-
ning's awareness of Hutton's limit order execution policies, 79 but chiefly on
their conviction that the necessary processes of the OTC markets might make
Manning's claimed expectations unreasonable.8 0 Each of the dissenting opi-
nions urged a remand so that the scope of Hutton's duties and the range of
the customer's protected expectations could be evaluated in light of the
market risks and economic constraints of market makers.8 1 Both opinions
insisted that neither the trade execution nor disclosure obligations of market
makers could be developed in a vacuum, but must be informed by a sound
vision of market mechanics and the particular relationships of individual
broker-dealers and their customers.8 2 The tone of these opinions is heated
and disappointed, reflecting a conviction that whatever Hutton's duties
should have been, it was imperative that such duties be more carefully and
persuasively grounded. The deep division the case produced in the Commis-
sion illustrates the failure of adequate explanation of the disclosure duty
imposed by the majority.
b. The aftermath of Hutton
The unease surrounding the entire Hutton litigation and the weakness of
the Commission's reasoning are suggested by the events subsequent to the
SEC's decision. Following a petition for rehearing before the SEC and denial
of that petition,83 Hutton filed a notice of appeal in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.8 4 Hutton presented a statement of
issues that challenged anew the NASD's and the Commission's position that
limit order customers in the OTC market have a right to assume their brokers
will cease normal market making activities pending execution of their cus-
78. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84;303, at 89,333 (July 6, 1988) (Grundfest, Comm'r, dissenting);
id. 84,303, at 89,336 (Fleischman, Comm'r, dissenting).
79. Id. 84,303, at 89,334.
80. Id. 84,303, at 89,333-334, 89,335-340.
81. Id. 84,303, at 89,336, 89,340.
82. Id. 84,303, at 89,333, 89,336.
83. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,330 (July 6, 1988) (petition for rehearing filed and
denied July 18, 1988).
84. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-1649 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 11, 1988).
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tomer's limit orders.15 Hutton agreed to drop the appeal, however, when it
was able to negotiate with the SEC and the NASD an informal agreement
that permitted Hutton's counsel to draft a proposed safe harbor regulation
to permit ongoing market making activities by NASD dealers holding cus-
tomer limit orders.8 6 The draft regulation was submitted in the form of a
proposed addendum to the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. In substance, the
draft regulation would produce a result identical to that required by the
Commission-limit order subordination would be permitted if adequately
disclosed.17 The proposed Rule has been approved by the NASD membership
and is expected to be approved by the SEC.
85. Among the issues noted for appeal were:
2. Whether, under the unusual facts of the case, Hutton acted in a manner consistent
with "just and equitable principles of trade" by
A. accepting Manning's limit order and assuming the limited agency function
of monitoring the Genex market and executing the order only if the bid side
of the market reached the limit price;
C. continuing its normal market-making activities by selling Genex stock at
prices equal to or better than the limit price while Manning's limit order
remained unexecuted because the bid side of the market never reached the
limit price?
3. Whether in a dealer market, where a market maker realizes its profit on the
spread between the bid and the asked, it was unreasonable for Manning to expect
A. that Hutton would shut down its sell side marketmaking activities in Genex
stock and forego its customary dealer's spread on sales from its inventory
while Manning's order remained unexecuted, and
B. that during such shut down, Manning would be able to step into Hutton's
dealer shoes and sell his own stock at Hutton's asked price, notwithstanding
that he had assumed none of the risks or obligations of an NASD market
maker.
4. Whether the SEC erred in holding that the NASD's newly, announced requirement
of limit order priority in the absence of a waiver by a customer after full disclosure
could be "reasonably and fairly implied by an existing rule," notwithstanding
widespread industry practice, the NASD's own prior statements and the inherent
structure of the interdealer market negating the existence of such a requirement.
Id. (Petitioner's Statement of Issues).
86. Telephone interview with Richard T. Sharp, counsel for E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. (April
13, 1989).
87. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS No. 89-39, PROPOSED NEW RULE RE: HANDLING CUSTOMER
LIMIT ORDERS (May 1989). The Notice solicits members' votes on the text of proposed new
section 45 to Article III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. The proposed regulation reads
as follows:
(a) A member firm that has accepted and holds an unexecuted limit order from a
customer and continues to trade the subject security for its own market-maker
account at prices equal to or better than the limit order price shall not be deemed
to have acted in a manner inconsistent with Article III, Section 1 of the Rules of
Fair Practice if the member firm provides to its existing customers as of the effective
date of this rule and to each new customer at the time his or her account is opened
a written statement clearly disclosing:
(i) the circumstances in which the firm accepts limit orders, and
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In the end, the manifest awkwardness of Hutton's analysis of the limit
order execution problem, and the threat of judicial review, may have gen-
erated enough pressure to initiate an off-board rule making approach to
reconciling market making activities with limit order execution. Such non-
public resolutions of disputes are common in the field of securities regulation.
Still, the ultimate disposition of Hutton is disquieting, because it permits the
SEC's roughshod proclamation of duty to stand. The process through which
the safe harbor rule was proposed means that the Commission's arguments
in Hutton remain unchallenged, and the need for careful articulation of the
best foundations for proposed duties is not acknowledged.
The next section will describe the foundations of the argument that the
Board of Governors, and later the SEC, should have made for disclosure of
limit order policies of OTC market makers. The section will describe the
lost opportunities in Hutton and make clearer the reasons for the sharp
division among the SEC Commissioners in the final appeal of Hutton.
C. A Market-Based Argument for Disclosure of Limit Order Execution
Policy as an Alternative to the Decision in Hutton
As previously noted, Hutton relied on two basic arguments to justify its
practice of customer limit order subordination. The first was that a selling
limit order customer could not reasonably expect trade execution at other
than the market "bid" pricea The second was that the customer could not
(ii) the policies and procedures followed by the firm in handling such orders.
(b) If it is the policy of a member firm that acts as a market maker to accept limit
orders from its customers but not to grant priority to such orders over transactions
for its own market-maker account, a written statement substantially as follows
provided by the member firm would be deemed to constitute adequate disclosure
to its customers for purposes of paragraph (a) of this Section:
"By accepting your limit order for transactions in securities in the NASDAQ
or over-the-counter market, we undertake to monitor the interdealer market
and to seek to execute your order only if the inside bid (in the case of a limit
order to sell, the highest price at which a dealer is being quoted as willing to
buy securities) or the inside asked (in the case of a limit order to buy, the
lowest price at which a dealer is being quoted as willing to sell securities)
reaches your limit price. We reserve the right, while your limit order remains
unexecuted, to trade for our own market-maker account at prices equal to or
better than your limit order price and not to execute your order against
incoming orders from other customers. For example, if the inside market is
10 bid, 10 1/4 asked and you place a limit order to sell securities at 10 1/8,
we will seek to execute your order only if the inside bid reaches your limit
price of 10 1/8 (exclusive of any markdown or commission equivalent that we
may charge in connection with the transaction) and, while your order remains
unexecuted, we may continue to sell securities for our market-maker account
at prices at or above 10 1/8."
Id.
88. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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reasonably expect that a market maker would cease to buy and sell for its
own account while awaiting conditions permitting execution of the customer's
trade.8 9 Each argument is justified by the market risks thought to be under-
taken by OTC market makers. The key question is whether Hutton's account
of the risks faced by market makers is accurate enough both to justify limit
order subordination as the normal expectation of trade execution in the OTC
market, and to obviate a disclosure duty. To place the question in perspective,
it must be kept in mind that one of the unspoken pressures operating in the
Hutton litigation was the fact that the exchanges, including the New York
Stock Exchange, prohibit the exchange specialists who perform market mak-
ing functions, from preferring the execution of their proprietary trades to
the execution of customer limit orders. 9°
It seems an appealing idea that market makers in OTC markets should
subject themselves to the same discipline as exchange specialists by interven-
ing to trade only when required for the maintenance of an orderly and
89. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
90. For example, NYSE Rule 92 provides that:
(b) No member shall (1) personally buy or initiate the purchase of any security on
the Exchange for any such account [its own account or any account in which it is
directly or indirectly interested], at or below the price at which he personally holds
• . . an unexecuted limited price order to buy such security in the unit of trading
for a customer, or (2) personally sell or initiate the sale of any security on the
Exchange for any such account at or above the price at which he personally holds
* . . an unexecuted limited price order to sell such a security in the unit of trading
for a customer.
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2092, at 2683 (1989).
The role of the exchange specialist in an auction market requires such a prohibition. In an
auction market, the operation of the auction process is expected to set prices through a matching
of offers to buy and offers to sell at agreed-upon prices. If an exchange specialist were routinely
to execute its own sales transactions in advance of and at a price higher than a customer's limit
order sales price, the specialist would thereby have preempted the operation of normal market
forces by substituting a sales price for the price the market would have produced without his
intervention. By the same token, a specialist's purchase of stock in advance of and at a price
lower than a customer's limit order purchase price would give the market a purchase price
lower than it would have produced through its own operation. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note
16, at 66-67. Therefore, the exchange market specialist is permitted to substitute his own "bid"
and "ask" prices for those which the market would have produced if left to itself only when
his intervention is needed to prevent abrupt price movements caused by serious imbalances in
supply and demand. On such occasions, his duty to maintain an orderly and continuous market
compels intervention. See New York Stock Exchange Rule 104, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2104
(1989); id. at 2104.10 (definition and duties of "regular specialists"); id. at 2104.50
(regulation of income records). See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78k(b) (1982); Rule lib-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.llb-1; N. WOLFSON, R. PmLIPS & T. Russo,
REGULATION OF BROKERS' DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 11.04-11.06 (1977). The origin
of the exchange specialist's duties, and of Rule I lb-I is described in J. SELIGMAN, supra note
14, at 335-44. Seligman has suggested elsewhere that the creation of an integrated national
market system and the introduction of trading competition between exchange specialists and
OTC market makers might necessitate some change in the specialist's duty to maintain an
orderly market. See J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 61-62 (1985).
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continuous market. Yet, despite some legislative enthusiasm for the adoption
of customer limit order priority for OTC stocks, 91 there exists a consensus
among commentators that limit order priority is a creature of centralized
auction markets and is impracticable for the OTC market as it is now
constituted. 92
The special characteristics of the OTC markets thought to dictate subor-
dination of customer limit orders are: (1) decentralization of the markets;
and, (2) the greater risk associated with making markets in stocks generally
less liquid than those traded on the exchanges. 93 OTC market makers have
in the past been subject to more competition and suffered the disadvantage
of less accurate market information when compared with stock specialists
on the major exchanges, due to a decentralized market. 94 Unlike the tradi-
tional exchange specialist who controls all trading in a given security, 9 the
market maker in an OTC stock is typically one of several dealers making a
market in a security.96"The market maker, unlike the specialist, will not have
91. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON SECU-
RITIES, Report to Accompany S. 249, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1975).
92. Id.; see SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON
SECURITIES, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 111 (1973).
See also Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,502, at 80,033 (Jan. 26, 1978) (suggesting
"Central File" to give all agency orders auction-type protections).
An important question is whether the movement towards an integrated national market system
for publicly traded securities should look to the practices of the OTC interdealer market or to
the practices of the exchange auction markets for its basic model for setting execution prices
and for compensating market makers. Better understanding of the complexity of market
structures, and an appreciation that the particular features and practices of different markets
may be sound in context, has produced greater reluctance to suppose that the development of
a national market system will produce complete uniformity of practice among markets, or that
true integration of markets is a feasible or even a desirable goal. See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 16, at 610; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 49-53; Simon & Colby, supra note 14,
at 82-90; Calvin, supra note 14, at 802-06 (arguing that true integration is unnecessary but that
the greater equality in terms of trading on a nationwide basis has increased public confidence).
New research into the functioning of markets has produced this caution and skepticism. See
Ho & Stoll, supra note 22, at 1071.
93. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 16, at 660; Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note
22, at 1154; Stoll, The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets, 33 J. FIN. 1133 (1978)
[hereinafter Stoll, Supply of Dealer Services].
94. Stoll, Alternative Views, supra note 22, at 80, 85.
95. The Securities and Exchange Commission has tried to encourage multiple specialists for
the exchanges in the interest of improved competition in pricing and execution, but the effort
has largely failed because of the tendency of trading volume to flow to the specialist with the
greatest volume. See infra note 101. Customers apparently prefer the certainty of speedy
execution in a deep order book to the possibility that competition for trading might bring the
same speed and quality of execution. See Poser, supra note 14, at 909, 951-57. There may exist
other pressures for even a monopolist specialist to price his services fairly. He will be subject
to the constant indirect competition of a wide universe of alternative investment opportunities
in a variety of markets.
96. See Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note 22, at 1155, 1157-60, 1167-70 (stating
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direct information about the future flow of orders by all buyers and sellers
interested in a given security. There is no window on the entire market for
the market maker equivalent to the specialist's order book which allows the
specialist to monitor all trading and to gauge the future direction of the
market.
The relative blindness of the market maker in a decentralized market
carries with it acute risks of opportunistic trading by sophisticated traders
and by other dealers in the market, seizing upon short term information
advantages. An example offered by one study is the sophisticated trader who
divides a substantial buy or sell order among several market makers.97 Were
such an order placed with an exchange specialist, the specialist would be
able to match the order to a comprehensive record of orders on the other
side of the market, so that if the market's appetite for the large placement
was not keen, the customer's execution price would deteriorate through the
order. By contrast, the placement of simultaneous orders among several
market makers might more easily result in execution prices that did not
reflect an over supply of the stock.9 These additional risks of the OTC
market maker are reflected in the fact that the spreads in the "bid" and
"ask" prices of OTC stocks are typically wider than the execution fees of
specialists." These same risks have also been argued to justify a market
maker's continuous trading while holding customer limit orders. The market
maker may need continued access to the market and to the spread represented
by the difference between "bid" and "ask" prices to hedge risks and to
respond to an evolving market. The spread reduces the exposure necessarily
undertaken in maintaining an inventory in a security and standing ready to
accept orders of others in the market.' °°
While superior information reporting for OTC stocks through the NAS-
DAQ system and some deterioration of the information advantages formerly
enjoyed by exchange specialists when they enjoyed true monopolies in their
that as number of active dealers for given security increases, median concentration of trading
accounted for by any one dealer decreases; Stoll found that when there are 10 active dealers,
no more than 3001o of trading is concentrated in any one dealer). But see Poser, supra note 14,
at 951-57 (indicating that active competition among market makers is sometimes exaggerated
because orders will gravitate to market-maker with largest volume, who can provide the best
assurance of prompt execution). The Stoll study claims to anticipate and allow for this
phenomenon, however. See Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note 22, at 1161.
97. See, Ho & Stoll, supra note 22, at 1071; Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note
22, at 1161.
98. Ho & Stoll, supra note 22, at 1071.
99. Id. The interaction in the OTC market between dealer competition, which depresses
spreads between bid and ask prices, and the risk created by imperfect market information,
which widens spreads, is complex. The market maker must try simultaneously to maintain a
spread between "bid" and "ask" prices narrow enough to stimulate trading, yet broad enough
to allow an adequate profit on each transaction to provide protection against uncertainty as to
the trading positions of other traders in the market.
100. Respondent's Brief, Manning v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (No. 3-6490) (SEC Sept. 23, 1985);
Simon & Colby, supra note 14, at 93.
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stocks, have reduced the informational disadvantages of OTC trading,10 1 the
market information about OTC stocks traded by multiple market makers
remains relatively inexact when compared with the corresponding information
possessed by specialists on the major exchanges.
Moreover, there is evidence that the cure for this disparity is not to
duplicate the exchange specialist system for OTC stocks. The presence of
multiple market makers may in fact be desirable and necessary for some
types of securities, especially those that are lightly traded or relatively
volatile.10 2 Multiple market makers are able to distribute market risk and
produce greater liquidity at lower transaction prices than would a solitary
specialist.10 3 As one commentator has suggested, where the risks associated
with a market maker holding a position in a given stock are magnified by
the relative illiquidity of the market for that stock, there will be a tendency
for the market making function for that stock to become dispersed as market
makers attempt to minimize risk and to diversify their holdings °4 Moreover,
this pattern, intended to reduce market maker risk, is desirable for the
customers of market makers because it produces lower transaction costs for
trades in such illiquid stocks. At any given price level for the securities, a
monopolist dealer would be compelled to charge higher transaction fees for
purchase and sale orders in order to cover the concentrated risk he had
undertaken. 05 The presence of multiple dealers spreads both risk and creates
101. Greater access to market information about OTC stocks has been facilitated by NAS-
DAQ, and especially by "Level II" reporting of prices, which gives trading departments a
complete display of all market maker quotations in any given security. See Simon & Colby,
supra note 14, at 36-44. Multiple listings of securities and the proliferation of private trading
away from the market may blunt the information advantages of the exchange specialist, but
the notable failure of the efforts both to promote OTC trading of exchange-listed securities
and competition among exchange specialists resulted in little real change in the centralized order
flow of exchange-listed securities to monopolist exchange specialists. For comment on the mix
of sound and self-interested arguments that have delayed elimination of off-board trading
restrictions and other barriers to inter-market competition, see J. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at
35-53; Simon & Colby, supra note 14, at 47-53. For comment on the failure of active competition
to emerge among market makers and specialists, see Poser, supra note 14, at 951-57.
102. Stoll, Pricing of Dealer Services, supra note 22, at 1162-71.
103. Id.
104. Stoll, Supply of Dealer Services, supra note 93, at 1147.
105. Id. Other commentators have pointed out that the existence of greater risk will not by
itself produce a spreading of risk among many market makers when a stock is thinly traded.
Securities characterized by high risk and low volume attract few market makers, and those few
demand relatively wide spreads between "bid" and "ask" prices. These spreads reflect not only
exposure to high market risk, but the trading advantages conferred by near monopoly and by
the unavailability to other traders in the market of information about the true supply of and
demand for the security. With respect to thinly-traded stocks, market makers cannot count on
the continuous presence of other traders in the market. This absence of a ready market creates
a dependence on isolated market makers to provide prompt execution and informed pricing.
See Stoll, Alternative Views, supra note 22, at 87.
It has been suggested that such securities could be traded on terms more advantageous to
the market if the OTC market required exposure of a market maker's limit order book to other
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pressures on all market makers to set transaction prices that will improve
their chances of enjoying those transactions that do occur.1°6 Markets in
relatively illiquid stocks thus depend on competition to improve risk distri-
bution and to lower costs of trade execution to customers. 0 7
The risk profiles of certain OTC securities thus makes desirable, and to
some extent produces, the decentralized market competition among multiple
market makers, and the bid and asked pricing structure characteristic of the
OTC market. Those who support the market maker's right to the spread
between bid and ask prices argue that these broad characteristics of the OTC
market-decentralized, competitive, and relatively more risky than the ex-
change markets-provide the rationale for compelling retail customers to
defer to the bid-ask price structure and to limit order subordination, all as
a rough and ready approach to the basic dynamics of the market in OTC
stocks. 101
These arguments focus on the inherent risks of a decentralized market as
the rationale for the inferior treatment of customer limit orders in the OTC
market. Therefore, these arguments lose much of their force when the pattern
of trading in specific OTC stocks mimics trading in exchange-listed securities
with respect to liquidity and availability of market information. For example,
in the case of OTC stocks for which a deep, broad, and liquid market exists,
limit order execution practices should more closely mimic the structure found
in liquid auction markets. In a manner similar to a liquid auction market,
the dealer should match incoming buy and sell orders "at the market" and
rely principally on transaction commissions for compensation. Indeed, the
narrower dealer spreads which are typical in OTC transactions in highly
liquid stocks reflect the modest transaction risks of holding such securities.
traders so that the fairness of "bid" and "ask" prices posted by a monopolist market maker
could be more readily gauged and other willing market makers possibly attracted if transaction
costs of the monopolist were revealed to be too high. See Ho & Macris, Dealer Market Structure
and Performance, in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY 43, 63 (1985).
106. See Farrar, The Coming Reform on Wall Street, 50 HAxv. Bus. REv. 108, 114-115
(1972); Ho & Stoll, supra note 22, at 1065-70.
Bid and ask quotations in any given stock are set by dealers with a view to encouraging
transactions which reduce the dealer's risk associated not only with holding the stock in question,
but the risks associated with his portfolio holdings as a whole. See Stoll, Supply of Dealer
Services, supra note 93, at 1142-43.
107. See Id.
108. The impact of these market dynamics on the pricing of transactions in securities is
suggested strongly by one study showing that the OTC market spread appears to be higher
than the specialist's spread on the NYSE when similar stocks are compared. W. Newton & R.
Quandt, An Empirical Study of Spreads, Research Memorandum No. 30, Financial Research
Center, Princeton University (Jan. 1979). Ho and Stoll have attributed this difference to the
advantages of centralized information and capacity to control the volume of trades at a given
price level that characterizes the monopoly specialist system and distinguishes it from the
multiple market maker system characteristic of the OTC market. Ho & Stoll, supra note 22,
at 1071.
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It is precisely the uncertainty over whether risks thought of as endemic to
the OTC market are in fact present with respect to particular transactions
that makes the disclosure duty imposed in Hutton appropriate. If the practice
of "trading through" customer limit orders both seems justified to some
(undefinable) degree because of risks inherent in decentralized markets, yet
carries with it the risk of abuse, a disclosure rule both permits the practice
and creates a climate where the market maker/broker must continually alert
customers to its conflict of interest. Market makers will be pressed to provide
the best execution possible to customers and will be discouraged from
resorting to protective trading practices except to the extent necessary to
respond to inherent market risks which threaten their ability to function as
market makers. Disclosure of limit order execution policies may discourage
marginal and doubtful recourse to trading through customer limit orders,
yet allow the practice to survive where needed.
The result in Hutton would have been far more satisfactory had the NASD
and the Commission treated the case as one where a disclosure duty was
imposed in order to narrow the range where a necessary but risky practice
was allowed to operate. What was required in the case, especially in view
of the existence of a body of NASD statements indicating that limit order
subordination might be justified by the dynamics of the OTC market, 1°9 was
some effort to convey just why the earlier accepted models of OTC market
dynamics and market maker risk required modification. A simple statement
that a decentralized market necessarily creates greater uncertainty about the
terms of trading which a retail customer might have available, and therefore
justifies disclosure of limit order execution practices, would have sufficed.
Instead, the SEC's decision in Hutton turned on a sloppy dispute between
the Commission's invocation of broad fiduciary principles and an uncon-
vincing marshalling of earlier authority, on the one hand, and Hutton's
wide-of-the-mark effort to establish the universal validity of limit order
subordination on the other. At the very least, the Commission should have
more positively tied its disclosure duty to the fact that the complexities of
conditions of trading in a decentralized market make it reasonable that a
market maker inform the customer of its own practices, as those practices
might not represent the best available terms in the market.
Hutton illustrates that as much, if not more, care need be taken in stating
the foundations for the legal duties imposed on stock and commodities
professionals as in stating what those duties are. Rather than exercising such
care, the duties imposed by the SEC in Hutton were made to appear as
reflexive responses to market practices which were presumed to be unfair.
This failure reduces confidence in the processes of decision. One can sense
in the case an intuitive opposition to a fiduciary's trading for its own account,
but the case illustrates the perils of such intuitive responses when trouble is
not taken to validate them. Even the adoption of a modest disclosure duty
109. See supra note 25.
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may require adequate explanation, especially against the background of
orderly rule development and disciplined adjudication in technical areas that
has characterized the regulation of securities markets and market profes-
sionals. The Commission in Hutton offered the bland statement that "the
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the admin-
istrative agency." 0 The flexibility and immediacy of response offered by
adjudication can, however, be perilous, and courts and agency tribunals
must proceed with care.
II. HUTTON IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER CASES
The disposition of Hutton seems all the more heavy footed when compared
with other recent cases in which a need to define the duties and primary
allegiances of brokers who perform multiple market roles has arisen. This
section will discuss three of those cases: United States v. Dial,"'I Eichler v.
SEC,"' and Wasnick v. Refco, Inc."3 Dial and Eichler were chosen because
each represents, in contrast to Hutton, instances where a court's efforts to
come to terms with the vague generality of fiduciary expectations produced
duties responsive to the reasonable expectations of brokers and customers,
and to the broker's role in the marketplace. Moreover, the SEC in Hutton
relied upon both cases as authority for its treatment of limit order subor-
dination as nothing other than a form of the self-preferential trading by
brokers and dealers that agency and security laws had always prohibited." 4
These cases are described here also so that their points of difference from
Hutton can be appreciated. The third case, Wasnick v. Refco, Inc.,",
illustrates a trial court successfully overcoming the difficulties of making a
persuasive case for the enforcement of broker duties exceeding the range of
duties established in a highly-regulated environment. The case shows the
desirability of continuing judicial participation in the development of broker-
dealer duties, and suggests ground rules for the helpful participation by the
courts in the development of duties in a highly-regulated field.
110. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,330 (July 6, 1988) (quoting SEC v. Chenery
Corporation, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).
For a consideration of the relation between formal rulemaking, ad hoc policy statements,
and adjudication as sources of broker-dealer duties in executing customer orders, see Cohen &
Rabin, supra note 55, at 691.
Ill. 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
112. 757 F. 2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985) (appealing Exchange Act Release No. 18,401, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,088 (Jan. 8, 1982)).
113. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
24, 1988).
114. E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,330 (July 6, 1988).
115. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
24, 1988).
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A. United States v. Dial and Eichler v. SEC: Instances of
Self-Preferential Trading Unjustified by the Broker's Market Position,
and Inconsistent with Legitimate Customer Expectations.
In both Dial and Eichler, brokers executed their own trades in preference
to those of their customers in settings where their practices were unjustified
by their positions in the market and inconsistent with the legitimate expec-
tations of their customers. In Dial, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the criminal
mail and wire fraud conviction of a commodities broker, based in part on
the broker's "trading ahead" of his brokerage clients in silver futures on
the Chicago Board of Trade."16 "Trading ahead" occurs when a commodities
broker, aware that the accumulated outstanding orders of his customers,
when executed, will be of sufficient volume to cause an upward or downward
movement in the market, buys or sells for his own or others' account in
advance of execution of those orders." 7 The object of the practice is to take
advantage of the expected price movement when the customer orders go
through. The vice of the practice is not only that it erodes general public
confidence in the fairness of the markets, but that it injures the interests of
the clients whose known trading intentions the broker exploits." 8
The Dial court properly characterized the defendant's conduct as a simple
act of misappropriation." 19 Despite the defendant's argument that no existing
statute, regulation, ethical norm, or rule of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") or the Chicago Board of Trade prohibited "trading
116. Dial, 757 F.2d at 171.
117. Id. at 166. The court explained "trading ahead" as follows:
The broker obtains a profit from information that he has not invested in producing
but that comes to him automatically in his capacity as broker. It is like a lawyer's
discovering that his client is about to make a takeover bid for another company
and rushing out and buying some of that company's stock before the bid is made
public.
Id.
118. A customer buy order executed after the broker's trade would be executed at a market
price inflated by the broker's anticipatory purchases; customer orders to sell would be executed
at a market price depressed by the broker's anticipatory sales. Id. at 169. Even if the customers
later liquidated their investments at a profit, they would nonetheless have been deprived of a
part of the profit they would have earned if the broker had placed the customers' orders first.
Id.
119. Id. In Dial, the defendant broker solicited the customer orders, implicitly representing
that he would seek the best price for his customers as their agent. Id. at 168. The duty not to
trade ahead does not depend, however, on who initiates the brokerage transaction. There is no
market risk to which commodities brokers are exposed nor is there a legitimate market function
that they perform that could justify the profit skimming represented by "trading ahead." In
fact, commodities exchange floor brokers, whose specialist-like risks might conceivably justify
hedging purchases or sales against anticipated market movements, are completely prohibited
from trading ahead of customer orders and even from trading for their own accounts except
insofar as it may be necessary to maintain an orderly market. Id. at 168 (citing Chicago Board
of Trade Rule 150(b) (1989)).
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ahead" by ordinary brokers, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the criminal
conviction. 120 The court relied principally on the argument that the com-
munication of trading information by customer to broker required that the
broker not use the information to the customer's detriment.' 2l Although the
court in Dial resorted to a broad fiduciary norm as the basis for liability,
the specific duty imposed and the rationale for that duty fully responded to
the legitimate expectations of both customer and commodities broker. Unlike
Hutton, where the operations of OTC markets give some support for the
defendant's argument that its practice of subordinating customer limit orders
was privileged by its risks as a market maker, there is no colorable argument
for the practice of trading ahead on misappropriated information.
Eichler v. SEC,122 like Dial, involved a case of unjustified subordination
of the customer's trading interests. In Eichler, the petitioner, Eichler, was
president of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. ("BEHR"). BEHR was
managing underwriter of an initial public offering of a stock to be listed on
the OTC market. 23 Evidently there was some breakdown in communication
among the dealers organizing the offering, because when the dealers began
to fill subscriptions for the new issue, it quickly became clear that more
subscriptions had been accepted than there was stock available. 24 Moreover,
the managing underwriter had made insufficient provision for enlargement
of the offering to cover the oversubscriptions. BEHR and the other members
of the underwriting and dealers' syndicates thus found themselves needing
to buy shares of the newly issued stock in the rapidly developing after-
market to honor their commitments to original subscribers. Worse, the hot
market for the new shares threatened to raise the cost of buying the shares
the syndicate members would need to fill original subscriptions. 21 BEHR
further contributed to market demand by having begun to accept orders
120. Id. The criminal context of the litigation led the defendant to offer the defense that no
specific prohibition barred "trading ahead." This line of defense was appropriate in the setting
of a criminal prosecution because its object is not only to cast doubt on the assertion that
"trading ahead" is a breach of a legal duty, but also to suggest that even if there was such a
breach, the wrongdoing was not sufficiently specified to sustain a charge of criminal wire and
mail fraud. The court noted that reliance on charges of breach of fiduciary duty, without more,
was a problematical foundation for a criminal conviction. Id. at 170 (citing Coffee, Some
Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematical Line Between
Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981)). The court concluded, however, that the
defendant's state of mind was consistent with a finding of criminal fraud. 757 F.2d at 170.
121. The practice is expressly forbidden for NASD broker-dealers. The reason is the manifest
violation of a customer's confidence. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 87-69, FRONT-RUNNING OF
BLOCKS, INTERPRETATION OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 OF THE
RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE (Oct. 20, 1987).
122. 757 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. Id. at 1068.
124. Id.
125. Id. The situation would also be embarrassing because it would have indicated to the
issuer of the stock that appetite for the stock had been badly underestimated and the stock
poorly priced.
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from its brokerage customers to buy shares of the newly issued stock in the
after-market. 26
To avoid a rapid run-up in price, BEHR decided both to delay purchases
of stock needed to fill original subscriptions and to execute only prorated
portions of brokerage customers' orders. BEHR did not advise its clients of
either of these decisions.127 Rather, BEHR continued to buy the desired stock
in moderate amounts for its own account to hedge the risks created by its
obligation to deliver shares at original issue prices to subscribers in the public
offering.
A customer complained that BEHR was buying in competition with its
brokerage clients and failing to execute orders. This gave rise to disciplinary
proceedings by the NASD. 2s BEHR took the position that the conflicts
created by its dual role as broker-dealer for its retail customers and as
syndicator for the new issue constituted market conditions which limited its
order execution capacity and the legitimate expectations of its brokerage
customers. 129 Specifically, BEHR stated that it had declined to bid aggres-
sively enough to execute customer orders in an effort to halt the after-market
price rise, 30 arguing that its duty as a market maker to maintain an orderly
market dictated its restraint in bidding. Furthermore, BEHR maintained that
as dominant market maker for the stock, it might have exposed itself to
sanctions for market manipulation had it raised its "bid" price for the stock
to levels high enough to fill customer orders. 3' Therefore, BEHR maintained
that, far from injuring the interests of brokerage clients, it had both main-
tained an orderly market and offered partial execution at per share prices
that were lower than they would have been, had the stock been bid up
sufficiently to allow full execution.3 2
The NASD, the SEC, and eventually the Ninth Circuit properly rejected
each of these defenses. The main point of each tribunal was that a broker-
dealer has a specific and clearly established duty to execute market purchase
orders sequentially and in their entirety, or to obtain a customer's consent
to alternative arrangements.' If a dealer judges that the customer might be
better served by partial execution or other arrangements, the dealer must
consult with the customer before taking such action. 3 4 Moreover, BEHR
had no duty, either in its capacity as market maker, or as syndicator of the
new issue, to maintain an orderly market or to control the rate of price
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1070.
128. Id. at 1068.
129. Id. at 1069.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1069-70. See also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for discussion of the
issue of market domination.
132. 757 F.2d at 1069-70.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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increase.'35 BEHR's duties to the market were not analogous to an exchange
specialist's, rather, BEHR's sole obligation to the market, as one among
several market makers, was to establish its own "bid" and "ask" prices in
a way that fairly reflected an unmanipulated market. The court rejected
BEHR's claim that any bidding up of the stock might have exposed it to a
charge of market manipulation on the simple ground that actual demand
for the new stock would have justified price increases. 3 6
Unlike the position of the OTC market maker holding a customer limit
order in Hutton, nothing about the risk of an underwriter of an initial OTC
public offering justifies restriction of a brokerage customer's expectations
for first-come-first-serve execution in the after-market. Indeed, BEHR placed
itself in the awkward position of needing to compete with customer market
orders. BEHR had both failed to assess accurately the market demand for
the new offering and failed to address the risks of over-subscription by the
customary means of contracting for the issuance of additional shares to
provide for unanticipated demand. In violation of an unambiguous duty to
execute customer orders fully and in sequence, BEHR attempted to shift to
its retail customers risks created by its own doubtful performance as an
underwriter.137
B. Wasnick v. Refco, Inc.: The Broker's Duty to
Refuse to Trade for an Unfit Customer
The important question raised by Wasnick v. Refco, Inc.,' 31 is whether
there should be room for a court to impose a common law duty that a
commodities broker refuse to trade for an unfit customer, given the reluc-
tance of existing regulations, of case law under the Commodities Exchange
Act and of industry practice to insist upon such a duty. 39 Wasnick thus
presents the difficult questions of when judicial action to re-order legal
duties, established by expert regulation, is appropriate, and what restrictions
of form and content should be imposed on such intervention. 4° The challenge
is to articulate controls and limiting principles for judicial intervention so
that a court's approach to the question of broker duties will produce results
responsive to a sound conception of the mutual expectations of brokers and
customers, and to a desirable model of the relative roles of courts and
135. Id. at 1070-71.
136. Id. at 1069 n.3, 1070. The point was more clearly made in the original disposition by
the SEC of BEHR's appeal from NASD sanctions. See Exchange Act Release No. 18,401,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,088, at 84,797 (Jan. 8, 1982).
137. The sanctions ultimately imposed included fines and censure on the ground that BEHR's
conduct violated the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. See NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, supra
note 2, at 2151.
138. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
24, 1988).
139. See infra text accompanying notes 147-64.
140. See generally CAXAaRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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administrators in developing the specific content of broker-dealer duties.
The plaintiff in Wasnick had for seven years prior to the onset of the
litigation maintained various commodities trading accounts with the defen-
dants Conti Commodities and its successor Refco, Inc. 4 The plaintiff,
controlled the accounts and during the period of his relationship with Conti
and Refco, frequently engaged in binges of frenzied and irrational trading.
He traded large numbers of contracts in wide varieties of commodities, far
beyond his capacity to monitor. On a given day's trading, he would move
precipitately and randomly in and out of various trading positions. Even in
a market environment known for its acceptance of bizarre trading strategies
and for the unaccountable success of irrational trading systems, practices
such as the plaintiff's are regarded as doomed and virtually certain of
destroying the investor's capital. 42 The plaintiff did much of his trading in
person at the defendants' offices, and he was well-known to the brokers
who handled his account and to the managers of the offices where he traded.
141. Wasnick v. Refco, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 1988).
142. See, e.g., Melamed, A Professional's View of Commodity Trading, in BEFORE YOU
SPECULATE, at 11 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange 1978) (Remarks of Chairman of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Board):
One must approach commodity trading as a business venture and apply good
business techniques and judgment. Commodity trading is not a game or a gamble
to which one can apply rules of chance or probabilities.
One must have a certain degree of technical knowledge, both regarding market
trading in general and the commodity or commodities in particular....
One must work with a competent broker who is both conscientious and relatively
knowledgeable ..... dividing the winners from the losers.
DON'T OVER TRADE
Perhaps the second-most-important principle is not to overtrade. This cannot be
defined in terms of money or in terms of how many trades to make in a week, a
month, or a year. It will depend on a number of factors, but the important
consideration is that overtrading will necessarily overexpose you to risk, not to
mention unnecessary commissions.
You must accept the fact that you cannot take part in every move the market
will make-and you shouldn't want to. The most successful trader-of those not
on the trading floor of an exchange daily-will pick his spots very carefully.
Id. at 12-13, 16 (emphasis added). See also O'Brian, Speculating and Money Management, in
BEFORE YOU SPECULATE, at 18 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange 1978) (Remarks of a former
governor, treasurer, and chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange):
RESTRICT TRADING
Many speculators make the common mistake of trying to trade every day, without
waiting for trends to develop, and of jumping all over the lot into dozens of
different commodities looking for that pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. This
type of trading has two distinct disadvantages: One, it spreads the speculator's risk
capital too thin, making him vulnerable to small adverse moves of the market. And
two, he cannot have sufficient knowledge about every one of the commodities that
he is involved in to make proper trading decisions. Most brokerage firms will urge
this customer to restrict his trading to not more than a half-dozen commodities.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the court found that as early as 1979, the defendant brokers
were aware that the plaintiff had a history of gambling problems and that
he had been active in Gamblers Anonymous. 143 Although the plaintiff enjoyed
occasional success, he eventually lost approximately $1.3 million during his
seven year relationship with Conti and Refco and paid some $400,000 in
commissions on his trades.' 4 The court found that the defendants' failure
to intervene to prevent Mr. Wasnick from destroying himself financially
constituted a negligent breach of a duty to act by a broker who had actual
knowledge that its customer was unfit to trade. 45
Such duties to intervene can arise under the common law from the
vulnerability of one party and the relative ease with which another party can
intervene to prevent injury or loss. 46 Typically, however, the common law
has been unwilling to impose such "good samaritan" duties in the absence
of some legally recognized relationship between the victim and the proposed
rescuer, 4 7 or in the absence of some clear public policy directive indicating
that special duties should be imposed. 48 Wasnick does not fit clearly into
these classifications, because a regulatory policy choice had been made not
to impose the very duties the plaintiff argued were owed him. Although
there are decisions which have imposed tivil liability on commodities brokers
for failure to determine investor suitability, 49 these decisions were based on
the willingness of the CFTC to infer such a duty from the general antifraud
provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA"). 50 The CFTC was
143. Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,315, at 35,381 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 1988).
144. Id. 24,315, at 35,382.
145. Id. 24,315, at 35,379.
146. See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 110-13 (1908).
147. See Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 279-92 (1980) (effort
to make case for duty to intervene, based on relative ease to rescuer and vulnerability of victim).
The SEC has frequently pointed out that the duty of securities dealers to treat their customers
fairly arises from holding themselves out as possessing specialized knowledge and skill and from
cultivation of their customers' trust and confidence. See, e.g., In re Allender Co., 9 S.E.C.
1043, 1053-57 (1941); In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939); Loss, The SEC and
the Broker-Dealer, I VAND. L. REV. 516, 527 (1948).
148. See D. DOBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed.
1984).
149. See, e.g., Shefter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,022 (CFTC Apr. 23, 1986); Yi v. Int'l Trading Group,
Ltd., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,958 (CFTC Mar. 13, 1986);
Phacelli v. Conti Commodity Servs., Comm., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,345 (CFTC Sept. 12, 1984).
150. See also Bieganek v. Wilson, 642 F. Supp. 768, 772-74 (N.D. Ill. 1986), vacated in part
sub nom. Bieganek v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing importance of CFTC's
views on willingness of courts to imply an obligation to determine investor suitability).
The relevant language of the Commodity Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any corre-
spondent, agent or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order
to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate
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later to express doubts whether a duty to determine investor suitability should
be inferred from the CEA's antifraud prohibition,' and by the time of the
Wasnick litigation, most courts had begun to interpret this administrative
ambivalence as a signal to discontinue imposing that duty. Their actions
reflected the fear that however attractive a duty to screen out inappropriate
traders might sound, such a duty might be inconsistent with an informed
regulatory view of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between
customer and broker.5 2 The court in Wasnick makes clear that its imposition
of a duty to protect an unsuitable customer is not based on the discredited
commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market,
for or on behalf of any other person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection
with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity
for future delivery, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract
market, for or on behalf of any other person if such contract for future delivery
is or may be used for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in such
commodity ... , or (b) determining the price basis of any such transaction in
interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) delivering any such commodity sold,
shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the fulfillment thereof-(A) to cheat
or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person; (B) willfully to make
or cause to be made to such other person any false report or statement thereof,
...; (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order to contract or the disposition or execution
of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with
respect to such order or contract for such person ....
7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
151. For a description of the Commission's initial adoption of a "suitability" rule, its
abandonment of that rule and its eventual retrenching of the policy position on which the rule
had been grounded, see Bieganek, 642 F. Supp. at 772-74.
152. Id. at 774. See also Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., No. H88-0035, at
12-15 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 1989); Kearney v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 701 F. Supp.
416, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (court recognized there is no suitability rule under Security Exchange
Act); Foster v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 23,970, at 34,405 (CFTC Nov. 5, 1987); Kats v. Merrill Lynch Commodities,
Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep., (CCH) 21,998, at 28,387 (CFTC
Feb. 3, 1984) (no basis for finding a duty to prevent unwise trading where trades were authorized
by customer; broker's obligation with respect to advising client as to client's financial and
temperamental suitability to invest in commodities futures consists of no more than duty to
advise client of risky nature of transaction contemplated by client); Leib v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (broker had no
obligation to inform client that his pattern of trading was almost too risky to be profitable;
broker had no duty to restrain client from trading heavily where client retained control of the
account).
Even the main case support for the argument that a duty exists to determine customer
suitability does not hold that a broker has an obligation to intervene to stop a foolish course
of trading that the customer knowingly undertakes. See Phacelli v. Conti Commodity Servs.
Comm., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,345, at 32,674 (CFTC
Sept. 12, 1984) (customer who makes a knowing and meaningful election to undertake the risks
of commodity future trading cannot recover his losses by claiming that his account executive
should have warned him that he was unsuitable for such risk).
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implied duty theory,'53 but the choice to impose a duty specifically rejected
by the CFTC placed the court under pressure to justify that duty.
The court in Wasnick defended its proposed duty in its finding that
prevailing practices and standards of a substantial part of the commodities
dealers' community supported an obligation by brokers to protect unsuitable
customers from ill-advised trading. 54 The court noted that the dealer com-
munity had itself chosen to respond to the high risks of commodities futures
trading by adopting norms of fair dealing requiring protection of unsuitable
traders. In the court's view, the translation of these norms into an affirmative
legal obligation to intervene in clear cases of trading incompetence seemed
a practicable and obvious precaution to reduce investor risk.'55
The difficulty with the court's findings of industry practices is that despite
the existence of any number of general statements by leaders of the com-
modities industry attesting to their awareness of the riskiness of trading and
their wish to screen inappropriate participants from the market, 5 6 the case
for a duty to intervene based on industry practices and policies is far from
clear. First, the general statements themselves were made in anticipation of
the adoption of a rule that has since been withdrawn that required com-
modities traders to establish the suitability of potential clients. 5 7 Later
statements by the Commission and the strong trend of recent litigation
suggest that the consensus in favor of a broker's duty to protect unsuitable
153. The court in Wasnick made clear that the decision was not based on the antifraud
provision of the CEA. The Ninth Circuit requires proof of scienter in civil suits under the
CEA. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th-Cir. 1979).
The court in Wasnick was unwilling to find that the defendant had acted with the willfulness
or recklessness needed to establish scienter. Nonetheless, Judge Dwyer stated that had scienter
been established, Conti-Refco's failure to make clear to Mr. Wasnick his unsuitability for
trading would have supported an action under the CEA. See Wasnick v. Refco, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,315, at 35,379 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 1988).
154. Id. 22,315, at 35,379-80.
155. Id.
156. See Weinberg, Who are Those Commodity Speculators and What are They Doing To
Us? in BEFORE YOU SPECULATE, at 19, 23 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange 1978) (Remarks by
former chairman of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Exchange):
NOT ALL WELCOME
Not all speculators are welcomed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, however.
The Exchange's extensive educational and advertising program devotes much of its
attention to discouraging the UNsuitable speculator; the person who has prior
financial obligations to meet, or who has insufficient risk capital, or who simply
doesn't have the temperament to study commodities and make rapid and realistic
decisions. ...
Id. See also MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH, INC., POLICY BULLETIN No. 76-12 (May
24, 1976) (setting out guidelines for trading practices and for recognition of danger signals and
customer liquidity).
157. The CFTC's proposed suitability rules were under consideration at the time of the public
statements appearing in notes 142 and 156 supra. See also Consumer Protection Rules (Pro-
posed), 42 F.R. 44742, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,474, at
21,928 (CFTC Sept 6, 1977).
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traders may not have survived withdrawal of the rule.' Second, the evidence
of specific screening practices among brokerage firms is highly equivocal,
and more often suggests that screening is meant to establish that clients will
pay their bills and not be bad losers rather than that clients are well advised
to trade commodities.5 9 Further, while it seems that the riskiness of com-
modities trading is routinely communicated to potential customers, there
also seems to be a common expectation that it is the customer who will be
responsible for deciding whether those risks fit his tastes or his abilities to
suffer loss.'6
The doubtful support of industry practice for Wasnick's rule of interven-
tion and the clear discomfort of the CFTC and many courts with imposing
a duty to halt unfit traders suggests that willing choices may have been made
not to adopt a model of broker's duties which requires the solicitousness
and intervention implied by Wasnick. Both courts and regulators seem quite
uncomfortable with recognizing an obligation for a broker to prevent ill-
advised trading when the trading is directed by the customer.' Thus, if the
duty imposed by Wasnick is to be persuasive, it must be reconciled with or
allowed to supplant the vision of broker duties reflected in current com-
modities cases and legislation.
The reasons why a customer screening rule has not been adopted may
help answer the question whether such a reconciliation is possible or such a
supplanting is desirable. The current reluctance to require brokers to screen
their customers seems not to be caused by a feeling that it should be
acceptable for brokers to reap commissions from persons whose unfitness
could be agreed upon, but by fears that the burden of defining and applying
standards of unfitness may be too great. 62 That is, brokers are not spared
158. See supra note 150.
159. The author has reviewed the office procedure manuals of Conti Commodities, Refco,
Inc., Merrill Lynch Commodities, and Smith, Barney, all introduced as trial exhibits in the
Wasnick litigation. The obvious concern of these materials is the welfare of the brokerage
house. The fact that customer screening practices are intended to reduce the broker's, not the
customer's, risk has been adopted by some courts as reason enough to deny a customer's right
to rely on screening to stop his ill-advised trading. See J.E. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, 572
F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman,
593 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838.(1979).
160. Risk disclosure statements are routinely provided to commodities customers, and the
signing of such statements is usually insisted on as a condition of trading. Such warning of the
riskiness of commodities trading is the typical extent of the broker's duty for a nondiscretionary
account. See, e.g., Kats v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,998, at 28,387 (CFTC Feb. 3, 1984).
161. Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 111-12
(N.D. Ala. 1971) (usually "[t]he affair entrusted to a broker who is to buy or sell through an
exchange is to execute the order, not to discuss its wisdom").
162. The rejection by the CFTC of its former position that a suitability rule could be inferred
from the anti-fraud provisions of the CEA seems to reflect more a concern with the practicability
of requiring brokers to determine suitability than a toleration of the idea that the market would
be well-served by a culture of stark opportunism among brokers. See Avis v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,379, at 25,829-30
(CFTC Apr. 13, 1982).
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the duty of declining to execute trades for customers who are clearly un-
suitable because the expectation that they do is unreasonable. Indeed, there
is a consensus that brokers, who provide public access to a risky, volatile
market, the honesty of which is often suspect, should avoid trading for
customers who are plainly unsuited to the market. Rather, the duty not to
trade for unsuitable customers has not been imposed because of the difficulty
in developing acceptable regulatory guidelines for identifying cases where the
duty should be imposed among a universe of cases where the duty might be
imposed. 63 The question of the appropriateness of judicial entry into the
field is therefore a question of whether courts should, under the common
law, proffer and enforce standards of presumed investor unfitness and of
the evidence needed to establish the broker's knowledge of that unfitness
when specialized bodies have been unwilling or unable to do so as a matter
of regulation.
The argument for acceptance of such judicial intervention is strong in.
Wasnick. The duty imposed by the Wasnick court, to refuse to trade for a
manifestly unfit customer, is a duty that arises from the uncontested norm
that brokers should curb their opportunism when their actions would un-
justifiably injure their client's interests. In spite of regulatory reluctance to
adopt a comprehensive statement defining the reasonable steps that a broker
should take to screen unfit customers, there is room in Wasnick for the
creation of a specific, tailored duty to refuse to trade for a customer who
is known to be vulnerable. This is so precisely because the narrow factual
basis of the litigation does not require the adoption of a regulatory statement
which would be adequate to describe the totality of a broker's duty to screen
his customers. The reluctance of regulators to adopt universal rules ought
not to deter courts from the development of duties to address particular fact
patterns.
The Wasnick court focuses on the particulars of a given broker-customer
relationship and imposes a duty to intervene only after finding that Wasnick's
brokers could not have been unaware that their customer's trading pattern
would lead to his financial ruin. The concern with the particulars of a given
broker-client relation as the source of duties, and the finding that Wasnick's
brokers possessed actual knowledge on which they might have acted creates
a foundation for the recognition of a duty to intervene that is valid whether
or not there is a universal regulatory approach. It may be that there will be
163. The present form of the SEC's proposed "Penny Stock Fraud Rule," Rule 15c2-6,
which would require a suitability determination before trading customers in risky "penny
stocks," Exchange Act Release No. 34-26529, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,352 (Feb. 9, 1989), may come to be rejected for the same reason. Although there seems
to exist a willingness to prevent broker's trading unsuitable investors in high risk securities, the
burdens of information gathering, record keeping, and disagreements about what "suitability"
means, have generated opposition to the penny stock suitability rule. See ABA Members
Comment on SEC Proposed Penny Stock Fraud Rule, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 8 (May
10, 1988).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
errors in fact-findings from case to case. Only if brokers and dealers are to
be made immune to a risk universal to litigation is there room to insist that
courts should be denied the right to develop ad hoc duties responsive to
existing and accepted norms.
It could be argued that the very fact of imposing exacting norms of
conduct on brokers and dealers tends to so distort fact-findings that it is
unfair to expose brokers and dealers to the risks of an indefinite standard
of care without bright line expectations. There will inevitably be disputes
about whether the facts of a particular relationship between a broker and
client should give rise to particular duties, but the courts have generally
shown themselves capable of weeding out the more dubious cases, and of
developing sound and workable duties from broadly stated principles.'6
Wasnick too, though it errs in identifying existing industry practices as a
clear foundation for a duty to protect unsuited customer's from trading, is
sound in its focus on the particular features of a broker-customer relationship
as the proper source of a broker's duties. The pivotal role of brokers and
dealers in affording public access to investment markets, and the public
importance of cultivating public confidence in the markets, is reason enough
to encourage the development of judge-made duties and of the maintenance
of standards of care that are open to some interpretation.
III. CONCLUSION
Hutton and Wasnick have been criticized most severely for imposing duties
on brokers and dealers that are neither grounded in a sound view of the
operation of financial markets and the broker-dealer's function in those
markets, nor precisely contained enough to avoid impositions of unreasonable
duties in later cases.165 The criticism is significant. However much the choice
of a fiduciary label may imply a choice to burden one party with obligations
to subordinate his interests in ways he might not have chosen, the particular
duties flowing from that choice must make sense in the setting where they
are asserted. Current conceptions of the fiduciary relation have been partic-
ularly insistent that fiduciary language be less amenable to the creation of
extravagant duties, and that statements of duties be more particularized and
164. See, e.g., Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,702, at 93,427-430 (Apr. 2, 1986). In Xaphes the plaintiff
attempted to argue his unsuitability for trading and his broker's wrongful failure to bar his
trading in options. The plaintiff did not present the same evidence of mania nor engage in the
erratic course of frenzied trading that seems to have determined the result in Wasnick. The
court in Xaphes had no difficulty rejecting the plaintiff's argument that his broker should have
intervened.
The point is also borne out in Wasnick where the court, after finding that the broker had
breached a duty of care in continuing to exercise trades for Wasnick, apportioned causation
for the loss equally between Wasnick and the brokers. Wasnick v. Refco, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,315, at 35,383 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 1988).
165. See sources cited supra note 8 (criticisms of Hutton and Wasnick).
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sound in context. The need for such responsiveness is especially great in a
field such as securities and commodities regulation. Technical conditions of
the market may play a role in defining which duties can reasonably be
imposed. Furthermore, the legitimacy of those who propose duties will
demand that the duties imposed on brokers and dealers represent a fair
accommodation of the interests of these market professionals and their
customers and that the process of duty creation itself be sound.
The cases examined demonstrate that formulating untested broker and
dealer duties through adjudication requires a combination of circumspection
and boldness. Deliberative bodies must frame duties that respond to legiti-
mate market constraints on a broker's or dealer's functioning. Yet they must
not flinch from the task of developing specific duties on an ad hoc basis
when an informed and reasonable public vision of a market professional's
responsibilities to its customers demands it. The legitimacy of proposed
duties depends on the conformity of those duties with a sound vision of
how markets operate and of the proper accommodation of the rights of
customers and market professionals.

